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I. INTRODUCTION 
Elected judges are biased. Biased in favor of campaign contribu­
tors, in-state litigants, and parties (and causes) popular with the 
state’s electorate. Not every judge is biased, of course, and certainly 
not in every case, but often enough to make systemic judicial bias one 
of the biggest threats to the legitimacy of the American justice system 
and the rule of law.1 Despite its growing magnitude,2 the problem has 
proven intractable. It is not for lack of trying; proponents of judicial 
impartiality3 have long recognized these bias concerns and have 
struggled to discover solutions. 
This Article offers what is at once a novel and an originalist ap­
proach by reimagining an institution with a rich historical pedigree 
and one that the Founders believed should (and would) redress judi­
cial bias in civil litigation: the civil trial jury. But the civil jury as we 
have come to know it is powerless and largely obsolete because, in 
modern civil litigation, judges alone decide most cases—at least the 
ones that don’t settle—long before they reach the jury, and sometimes, 
as with post-verdict judgment as a matter of law or remittitur of dam­
ages, even after the jury has acted. Their tools of choice are the mo­
tion to dismiss, the motion for summary judgment, and the motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. These procedural mechanisms, which 
did not exist at common law or at the time of the founding, have made 
civil jury trials exceedingly rare. Pretrial disputes and motion prac­
tice are the most important phases of modern litigation.4  I argue that 
the people themselves, serving alongside elected judges on what I call 
Hybrid Judicial Panels (or Hybrid Panels), can act as a direct check on 
biased elected judges. These Panels would consist of a (professional) 
1.	 If this assertion sounds hyperbolic, consider that state judges handle approxi­
mately 98% of all civil litigation in the United States, including cases involving 
federal constitutional and statutory issues. Marc Galanter, A World Without Tri­
als?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 9. And more than 80% of those state judges are 
elected. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
43, 53 (2003). If it is indeed true that judicial elections often (or even sometimes) 
lead to judicial bias, then it is hard to imagine a bigger threat facing our legal 
system, a system that presupposes that cases will be tried to an impartial arbiter. 
See Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 
CONN. L. REV. 243, 252 (2000) (“One of the central tenets of the adversary system 
is that the judge remain impartial.”). 
2.	 In fact, as discussed in greater detail in Part II, infra, the problem continues to 
worsen as judicial elections continue to evolve in ways that accentuate the bias 
concerns. 
3.	 These proponents include groups and individuals as diverse as the American Bar 
Association, law professors, public interest organizations, and even elected (and 
unelected) judges themselves. 
4.	 Jeremiah L. Hart, Supervising Discretion: An Interest-Based Proposal for Ex­
panded Writ Review of § 1404(a) Transfer of Venue Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 139, 
141 (2011) (“The pre-trial disputes at the center of these early choices dominate 
modern litigation because few civil cases are tried”). 
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judge and a small number of jurors (or lay judges),5 and would decide 
determinative motions that are now decided by judges alone.6 The 
judge and the jurors would work together to decide these dispositive 
motions, most importantly the motion for summary judgment, remov­
ing a biased judge’s opportunity to rule in favor of a campaign contrib­
utor or against an unpopular litigant on her own. 
The concerns that this Article identifies are hardly new. For many 
years, relying on a combination of anecdotal evidence and common 
sense, critics of judicial elections have suspected that elected judges 
may be biased.7 But for much of American history, empirical evidence 
unequivocally proving the existence of such bias was lacking. In re­
cent years, that has changed. We now have plenty of data, in both the 
civil and the criminal contexts, showing that elected judges are biased 
in favor of those interests that helped them win their previous elec­
tion(s) and those that can help them win their future ones. 
But if concerns about election-related judicial bias are nothing 
new, why haven’t we solved them? Scores of articles have been writ­
ten discussing these problems, with one scholar even suggesting that 
the topic of judicial selection is the most written-about topic in all of 
law.8 The difficulty lies in the fact that if we accept the proposition 
5.	 In Part IV, infra, I briefly discuss how such jurors might be chosen. However, 
this Article merely introduces the idea of the Hybrid Panel. Further research 
and study would be required on the best way to implement the proposal and work 
out further specific details. 
6.	 Although the focus of this Article is the civil jury, a similar approach could be 
used to redress judicial bias in the criminal context. In particular, similar hybrid 
panels could be used during the sentencing phase of a criminal matter to ensure 
that judicial bias does not influence the punishment an elected judge imposes on 
a criminal defendant. For evidence of such bias in criminal sentencing, see notes 
81–85, infra. 
7.	 There is an open question in academic literature whether any judge can be truly 
impartial, and even on the meaning of impartiality. Every judge is influenced by 
a number of factors, including his upbringing, personal characteristics, exper­
iences, etc. See Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Everything You Always Wanted to 
Know About Judges but Were Afraid to Ask, 49 S.C. L. REV. 343, 346 (1998) (“Eve­
ryone, including every judge, is a conglomerate enterprise whose values and judg­
ments derive from a mysterious jumble of experiences since childhood.”). For the 
purpose of this Article, I only focus on the kinds of biases that everyone agrees 
are improper and should not be a part of judicial decision-making: specifically, a 
preference for a particular party because a ruling in favor of that party is likely to 
help the judge retain his job. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 
765, 775 (2002) (“One meaning of ‘impartiality’ in the judicial context—and of 
course its root meaning—is the lack of bias for or against either party to the 
proceeding.” (emphasis omitted)). 
8.	 Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: 
The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 31 (1986) (“Although 
surely no one has made a formal count, it is fairly certain that no single subject 
has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-related publications over 
the past fifty years as the subject of judicial selection.”). Although I am not famil­
iar with any empirical studies assessing this claim, it is undoubtedly true that 
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that elected judges are biased, then we must answer the obvious fol­
low-up question: Who will stop them? So far, that question has gone 
unanswered. 
The most obvious solution—doing away with judicial elections alto­
gether—is also the most untenable. Despite all their warts, judicial 
elections are supported by an overwhelming majority of the public.9 
Similarly unrealistic is the prospect of electoral reform specifically tai­
lored for judicial elections. Scholars have proposed a number of such 
solutions, including public financing of judicial elections, contribution 
and expenditure caps, and close monitoring and regulation of judicial 
campaign conduct. But recent Supreme Court decisions have made it 
clear that judicial elections largely play by the same First Amendment 
rules as all other elections.10 And those rules favor freedom for poten­
tial litigants (and their lawyers) to give money to judicial candi­
dates,11 to spend money on judicial candidates,12 and to allow judicial 
candidates to say what they want to say on the campaign trail.13 In 
other words, the very factors that are most likely to lead to judicial 
bias are the ones that, today, receive the greatest First Amendment 
protection. Eliminating the corrupting influence of money from judi­
cial elections is not only unlikely to gain political traction, but any 
efforts to do so are almost certainly unconstitutional under current 
Supreme Court doctrine. 
As a result, states deal with election-related judicial bias the same 
way they deal with all other types of judicial bias: by requiring the 
biased judge to recuse herself from the case. Some scholars have in­
deed touted recusal as the best solution to the biased judge problem.14 
judicial selection processes, and judicial elections in particular, have received sig­
nificant scholarly and media attention. 
9.	 Geyh, supra note 1 (explaining that 80% of the public favors selecting judges by 
election). 
10.	 See White, 536 U.S. 765. But see James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First 
and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 727 (2011) (suggesting that the Court might be willing to recognize differ­
ent rules in the context of judicial elections); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. 
Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding Florida’s direct solicitation ban for judicial election 
candidates). 
11.	 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating aggre­
gate contribution limits as violating the First Amendment). 
12.	 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the 
First Amendment prohibits restrictions on independent expenditures by a non­
profit corporation). The Court’s more recent decisions have suggested that First 
Amendment protection applies to all independent expenditures, including those 
of for-profit corporations and labor unions. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that a for-profit corporation’s religious lib­
erty is protected under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
13.	 White, 536 U.S. 765. 
14.	 Molly McLucas, The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judici­
ary, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 671, 692 (2009) (arguing recusal is “the only effective 
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Judges, too, have hinted that erecting more stringent recusal stan­
dards can alleviate election-related judicial bias.15 The focus on 
recusal also dominates the judicial ethics rules. The Model ABA Code 
of Judicial Conduct, as well as the ethics codes in all fifty states, re­
quires judges to step aside not only when they are actually biased, but 
also when their impartiality could reasonably be questioned.16 On pa­
per, at least, this strict standard requires that every biased judge, or 
even one who appears to be biased, be replaced with an impartial col­
league. And if recusal worked as intended, it would completely obvi­
ate the concerns raised by this Article. 
But recusal does not work for election-related judicial bias. One 
reason may be that judges typically decide their own recusal motions 
and have a disincentive to recuse precisely when recusal is most 
needed.17 A judge who truly feels a debt of gratitude towards a former 
contributor, or one who hopes to turn a current litigant into a future 
contributor, is also the judge least likely to step aside.18 But more 
importantly some judge—a judge—must hear the case, and every 
elected judge must worry about his or her electoral prospects. In other 
words, while recusal is theoretically a workable solution to individual­
ized judicial bias, recusal fails to address the systemic problem of elec­
tion-related judicial bias.19 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II sets out the problem. 
After briefly discussing the history and evolution of judicial elec­
means to ensure the impartiality of elected judges”); David K. Stott, Zero-Sum 
Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through Recusal Re­
form, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 482 (2009) (suggesting “recusal reform offers an 
effective, constitutional means of solving” the judicial bias problem that results 
from judicial elections). 
15.	 White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that rather than 
prohibiting judges from announcing their views during electoral campaigns, 
states could “adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, 
and censure judges who violate these standards”); see also Caperton v. A.T. Mas­
sey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that a West Virginia Court of Appeals 
justice was required to recuse himself when an officer of one of the parties played 
a major role in that justice’s election to the court). 
16.	 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(a) (2010). 
17.	 See Dmitry Bam, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135 
(2015) (arguing the self-recusal procedure is unconstitutional). 
18.	 These motions are properly understood as a dispute between the litigant and the 
judge, so the adversarial process would require those two parties to present their 
dispute to an impartial arbiter. But it is highly unlikely that any state would 
create such a process, as it is potentially very time-consuming. See id. 
19.	 Recusal remains an adequate solution when a specific jurist has a personal bias 
in favor or against a party that is not shared by his or her colleagues. For exam­
ple, if the judge owns stock in one of the corporate litigants, or is related to the 
lawyer arguing the case, the judge must recuse himself. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) 
(2012). 
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tions,20 Part II highlights the empirical evidence demonstrating that 
the judicial bias concern is both real and serious. That evidence over­
whelmingly shows that elected judges rule in favor of their contribu­
tors, in-state litigants, and the perceived political preferences of the 
electorate, while routinely ruling against out-of-state parties and un­
popular litigants and causes. Part II concludes by discussing the 
failed efforts to solve the bias problem. 
Part III examines the role that the jury could play, and was in­
tended to play, in checking biased judges. I show that at the time of 
the founding, the jury was the primary institution entrusted with en­
suring judicial impartiality and independence. Jefferson, Madison, 
Hamilton, and a long line of their Federalist supporters and Anti-Fed­
eralist opponents, all agreed about the importance of the jury and the 
jury’s central role in protecting constitutional guarantees against un­
scrupulous judges. The jury, more than any other institution, was to 
protect the people from judicial bias and corruption. Part III also of­
fers some reasons for why the jury was (and continues to be) the per­
fect institution for such a role, and how the jury was able to fulfill that 
function at the time of the founding. 
In Part IV, I argue that the jury can no longer serve that bias-
checking role.21 At the time of the founding, civil jury trials were com­
mon; today, they are virtually nonexistent. What had once been a vi­
brant institution integral to the structure of America’s government 
has become little more than afterthought. Today, few can even imag­
ine the jury serving such an important judge-checking role. In fact, of 
the thousands of articles written on judicial elections, judicial imparti­
ality, and judicial independence, to my knowledge not a single scholar 
has extensively examined the role that the people themselves might 
play in checking judicial bias by elected state judges. 
I conclude Part IV by offering a new approach. Rather than simply 
suggesting a return to an eighteenth-century division of labor between 
judges and jurors, I argue that jurors (or lay judges) should sit on 
Panels alongside elected judges to make key pretrial decisions that 
judges make on their own. This novel integration of the jury into the 
pretrial procedure helps preserve the historical benefit of the jury by 
allowing the people to act as a check on judicial bias, while at the 
20.	 Because much has been written about judicial elections, this Part does not offer a 
complete history or description. Rather, I summarize the practice and offer a 
history of judicial elections only as necessary to establish my major premise that 
judicial elections hamper judicial impartiality. 
21.	 As explained in greater detail in section IV.A, over the last century and a half the 
jury’s power has waned as the number of jury trials has declined and as the jury’s 
role in those trials has been limited. At the same time, the jury has been sub­
jected to a number critiques challenging its competence, impartiality, and 
efficiency. 
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same time preserving the advantages associated with judicial exper­
tise and modern rules of civil procedure. 
II. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE IMPARTIALITY
 
PROBLEM
 
An Article that begins by scandalously accusing judges of bias 
must back up that assertion. Therefore, after a brief description of the 
history of judicial elections in section II.A, section II.B presents the 
evidence of judicial bias, as well as some reasons why election-related 
judicial bias is an increasing threat to the rule of law with each pass­
ing election cycle. Then, in section II.C, I discuss our failed, recusal­
centered approach to judicial bias. 
A. A (Brief) History of Judicial Elections 
Although the specific mechanisms vary from state to state, and 
sometimes even from one level of a state judiciary to another,22 most 
state judges obtain, and retain, their seats on the bench through judi­
cial elections.23 Today, judges in thirty-nine states face the electorate 
to stay in office.24 This accounts for approximately 80% of all trial 
judges in the United States, and nearly 90% of our state judges.25 No 
other nation on earth elects judges to the extent that we do.26 This is 
especially true for lower-level trial judges—the judges that have the 
most direct interaction with litigants—who are sometimes subject to 
elections even when state supreme court justices are not.27 
22.	 Some state constitutions, for example, provide for elections of lower court judges, 
while opting to select their supreme court justices through gubernatorial appoint­
ment. See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7. 
23.	 There are three major kinds of elections: partisan, non-partisan, and retention. A 
rich body of literature has described, and critiqued, each of these methods. See 
generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDI­
CIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012) (explaining different selection methodolo­
gies and the reasons each was adopted). 
24.	 Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES (May 
25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/us/25exception.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/K5EX-6AXY (citing data 
from the National Center for State Courts). 
25.	 Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1077, 1105 (2007). 
26.	 In fact, only two other nations—Japan and Switzerland—have any judicial elec­
tions, but both elect a very small portion of the country’s judiciary. See Rachel 
Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections, 64 ARK. L. REV. 249, 258 
(2011). 
27.	 Compare AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, INITIAL SELECTION: TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL 
JURISDICTION (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J9L4-58P9 (discussing se­
lection methods for state trial court judges), with AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, INITIAL 
SELECTION: INTERMEDIATE  APPELLATE  COURTS (2013),  archived at http:// 
perma.unl.edu/CYU5-WKCW (discussing selection methods for state appellate 
court judges). 
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This was not always the case. In the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries, most state judicial selection systems mirrored 
their federal counterpart. In fact, in the late-eighteenth century, no 
state judges were elected to office.28 Rather, state judges were typi­
cally appointed by: (a) the governor, (b) the state legislature, or (c) 
some combination of the two.29 Not only did the appointment mecha­
nism mirror the federal system, so did the retention mechanism. 
State constitutions protected judges against political retaliation and 
favoritism, and sought to preserve judicial independence.30 Nearly 
every state offered judges the same tenure protections (i.e., life ten­
ure) as the Constitution provides federal judges.31 
But in response to a financial crisis that devastated the states in 
the middle of the nineteenth century and concerns about judicial cor­
ruption and politicization, most states abandoned their appointive 
systems in favor of judicial elections.32 Some have argued that judi­
cial elections were part of the Jacksonian movement towards greater 
populism.33 But historians have largely rejected that justification.34 
Rather, the driving force behind judicial elections was the belief that 
elected judges would be more independent—specifically, more inde­
28.	 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping 
Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 
839, 855 (2012). 
29.	 Id. (describing the selection methods at the time of founding for all thirteen origi­
nal colonies). 
30.	 William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1016–17 
(2001) (“[A]ll of the state constitutions provided some protection for judges 
against political retaliation . . . .”). 
31.	 In fact, the Federal Constitution was modeled in large part on the constitutions 
created by the states in the years after America declared independence in 1776. 
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (analogizing the draft Fed­
eral Constitution to the New York state constitution); see also William F. Swin­
dler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From Independence to the Constitution, 
17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 519 (1976) (“As finally drafted and ratified, the 
judicial article of the Federal Constitution in many respects reflected the basic 
features of the antecedent state instruments, though it also incorporated provi­
sions that varied significantly from the prior state models.”). 
32.	 SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 10. 
33.	 See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE 
OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 130 (rev. 2d ed. 2002). 
34.	 See SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 78; see also Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on 
Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 
1846–1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 353 (1983) (arguing that judicial elections were 
intended to “improve judicial administration, to increase the prestige of the bench 
and bar, to curtail partisan domination of judicial patronage, and to restore sepa­
ration of powers by curbing legislative excess”); Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of 
Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum 
America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 224 (1993) (criticizing “early commentators 
who disparaged the elective judiciary as the outgrowth of unthinking 
Jacksonianism”). 
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pendent of corrupt state legislatures.35 State judicial selection 
throughout the nation was transformed during this era. While almost 
no state used judicial elections prior to the 1830s,36 by the time of the 
Civil War twenty-four states had adopted partisan judicial elections.37 
Concerns about judicial partisanship that grew out of these parti­
san judicial elections led to two major progressive reforms in the 20th 
century. First, many states moved away from partisan judicial elec­
tions to non-partisan elections.38 The reformers hoped that removing 
the corrupting influence of party politics from the judiciary would, 
again, make judges more independent—this time of party bosses. 
Unfortunately, non-partisan elections exhibited many of the same 
problems as their partisan predecessors. Candidates in non-partisan 
judicial elections came to be perceived as affiliated more closely with 
one of the political parties. To make matters worse, removing the 
party cue from the little information voters already had about judicial 
candidates left voters entirely uninformed about how to cast their bal­
lot.39 When the non-partisan experiment failed (in the eyes of the re­
formers), some states adopted a system of merit selection. Also known 
as the Missouri Plan, merit selection is essentially a hybrid mecha­
nism that allows a governor to appoint a judge from a short list cre­
ated by a panel of experts. These panels usually include lawyers and 
lay people, and are supposed to evaluate potential nominees based on 
their merit. The nominated judge serves a short term in office, and 
then stands for a retention election. Retention elections are unusual 
because the judge does not run against another candidate. Instead, 
the voters decide whether to retain the judge for another term.40 
35.	 SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 148–54. 
36.	 A couple states experimented with elections for some judicial posts in the 1810s. 
Id. at 60. 
37.	 At least in theory, these judicial elections were much like any other partisan elec­
tion for government office. See Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judi­
cial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1421–25 (2001) (discussing potential 
concerns about partisan judicial elections). As discussed below, in practice, it was 
not until recently that judicial elections began to resemble elections for other of­
fices. Few scholars have defended partisan judicial elections. But see PHILIP L. 
DUBOIS, FROM  BALLOT TO  BENCH: JUDICIAL  ELECTIONS AND THE  QUEST FOR  AC­
COUNTABILITY (1980). 
38.	 SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 167–73 (discussing the transition from partisan to 
non-partisan judicial elections). 
39.	 B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1438 (2001) (“[P]artisan judicial elections indicate party affilia­
tion on the ballot, which may be a primary cue for many judicial election voters.”). 
40.	 For a thorough discussion of the Missouri Plan, see Stephen J. Ware, The Mis­
souri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751 (2009). 
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As a result of these changes, the states now have three different 
electoral mechanisms: partisan elections, non-partisan elections, and 
retention elections.41 All three, however, lead to concerns about bias. 
B. Evidence of Bias 
Are elected judges really biased? A number of recent (and some 
not-so-recent) studies provide a resounding answer to that question. 
On the whole, these studies show that elected judges are biased in 
favor of those interests that helped the judge get elected and can help 
the judge be reelected (e.g., donors, contributors, in-state litigants) 
and against the interests that have not and cannot (e.g., out-of-state 
litigants, unpopular litigants). As a result, certain favored interests, 
including campaign contributors and donors, fare well, while certain 
disfavored litigants, including criminal defendants, fare poorly under 
a variety of metrics and across jurisdictions. 
To any students of psychology or human nature, this should come 
as no surprise. To keep their jobs, judges need to win elections. And 
to win elections, judges need money—a lot of money.42 That money 
often comes from those that are most likely to appear in front of the 
judge as litigants or lawyers. Keeping the sources of that money satis­
fied becomes a priority for any judge that wants to keep his job. In 
addition, at the risk of stating the obvious, to win elections judges 
need votes. Therefore, keeping the electorate satisfied is another pri­
ority for any judge. Those two constant needs—money and votes— 
lead to significant problems. Worse, they lead to significant bias. 
1.	 Keeping the Contributors Happy 
Let’s begin with the group that seems to benefit most from judicial 
elections: campaign contributors.43 Studies show that judges over­
41.	 For the purposes of this Article, these differences are largely irrelevant. All three 
methods require judges to raise money for their reelection, and all three methods 
require that the judge face the electorate in order to keep her job. To the extent 
that a judge running in a retention election is less concerned about the prospect 
of losing her job, or needs to raise less money to run her campaign, the bias con­
cerns are lessened, but not entirely eliminated. Furthermore, as I show in sec­
tion II.C below, even retention elections are becoming highly competitive and 
raise many of the same bias problems. 
42.	 “To win significant elections today costs a lot more money than it did fifty years 
ago and requires a much greater media presence, particularly television advertis­
ing.” Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The De­
clining Influence of Lawyer-Statesmen Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5 NEV. 
L.J. 479, 498 (2005); Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from 
Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 452–55 (1988) 
(discussing how the amount of money needed to win judicial election has in­
creased dramatically since 1960s). 
43.	 For the purposes of this section, I sometimes use the phrase “campaign contribu­
tors” to refer both to those who gave money directly to a judicial candidate and 
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whelmingly rule in favor of those who helped them fund their earlier 
campaigns.44 For example, in one recent study, Michael Kang and 
Joanna Shepherd analyzed a significant number of judicial decisions, 
concluding that every a dollar a litigant spends on a judicial candidate 
increases the likelihood that the candidate, if elected, will rule in that 
litigant’s favor.45 Likewise, a New York Times study of decisions by 
the Ohio Supreme Court found that justices ruled in favor of their 
campaign contributors 70% of the time.46  And Ohio is not unique: an­
other study by Joanna Shepherd concluded that state supreme court 
justices throughout the nation “routinely adjust their rulings to at­
tract votes and campaign money.”47 This effect is especially profound 
if one of the parties (or its lawyers) made a significant contribution to 
the judge’s campaign.48 And even when both sides contributed to a 
judge’s campaign, the party that contributed more fares better.49 
These studies offer litigants a simple lesson: if you want to win your 
case, then you better pay up and hope your opponent does not pay 
more. 
None of this would be so troubling if lawyers and litigants that ap­
peared in front of judges rarely spent money on those judges’ cam­
paigns. And, early in the history of judicial elections, this was the 
those that made an independent expenditure to support a candidate. While the 
distinction between expenditures and contributions is significant for campaign 
finance law, it makes little difference here. In fact, even the Supreme Court, in 
Caperton v. Massey, referred to the independent expenditures in that case as 
campaign contributions. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 
(2009). 
44.	 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: 
An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011); see also Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign 
Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1 (concluding 
that Ohio Supreme Court justices ruled in favor of their contributors more than 
70% of the time); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case 
Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002) (con­
cluding that data shows contributors to judicial elections buy changes in law); 
Margaret S. Williams & Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of 
Attorneys’ Contributions on State Supreme Courts, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 
(2007) (concluding that some Wisconsin judges tend to rule in favor of 
contributors). 
45.	 Kang & Shepherd, supra note 44, at 73 (“We find that every dollar of contribu­
tions from business groups is associated with increases in the probability that 
elected judges will decide for business litigants.”). 
46.	 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 44, at A1. 
47.	 Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 
625 (2009). 
48.	 See Aman McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Cam­
paign Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 385, 
400 (2008). 
49.	 Vernon V. Palmer, The Recusal of American Judges in the Post-Caperton Era: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions Involving Campaign 
Contributors, 10 GLOBAL JURIST, iss. 3, 2010, at 1, 8. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2016] CIVIL JURY IN A WORLD WITHOUT TRIALS 873 
case. Unlike intensely competitive and highly partisan legislative and 
executive elections, judicial elections, for much of their history, were 
described as “sleepy,” “low key,” and “dignified.”50 Those elections 
were relatively inexpensive, meaning that judges did not need to fun­
draise.51 Candidates often ran unopposed.52 Few people contributed 
money to either sitting judges running for reelection, or candidates for 
office,53 meaning that judges were less likely to hear a case involving 
a contributor. 
Today, these elections are very expensive. In a matter of a few de­
cades, we have gone from spending almost nothing on judicial elec­
tions to spending approximately $83.3 million between 1990 and 1999 
to $206.9 million from 2000 to 2009.54 And new records are set every 
year.55 A judge seeking to retain his seat on the bench must rely on 
others to support him.56 
As a result of this transformation, it is not unusual for judges to 
hear cases involving a lawyer or a party who helped the judge’s elec­
tion bid.57 For example, a recent Pennsylvania study showed that 
50.	 Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 
IND. L. REV. 819, 819 (2002) (explaining that judicial elections “were once ‘low­
key affairs, conducted with civility and dignity’” (quoting Peter D. Webster, Selec­
tion and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best ” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1, 19 (1995))); David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Fu­
ture of State Judicial Selection, 69 ALB. L. REV. 985, 985 (2006) (“Judicial selec­
tion is a historically sleepy affair . . . .”) 
51.	 SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 241 (describing judicial election campaigns as “rel­
atively inexpensive”). 
52.	 David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267 
(2008) (describing old-style judicial elections). 
53.	 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 
185 (2006) (“Prior to the 1970s, judicial elections were sleepy events garnering 
little attention and involving relatively small sums of money.”). 
54.	 JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009: DEC­
ADE OF CHANGE 8 (Charles Hall ed., 2010). 
55.	 Jordan M. Singer, Knowing Is Half the Battle: A Proposal for Prospective Per­
formance Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 725, 
730–31 (2007) (discussing record-breaking campaigns in judicial elections 
throughout the United States). 
56.	 See Pozen, supra note 52, at 306 (“[T]he time drain of campaigning has, one as­
sumes, become more pressing in recent years, as campaigns have become more 
expensive and competitive.”). 
57.	 See Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic Ac­
countability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 474 (2002) 
(“Often, lawyers or litigants who are likely to appear before the judge constitute 
large proportions of the contributions to judicial candidates.”). A New York Times 
study showed that Alabama Supreme Court justices routinely heard cases involv­
ing parties or amici who gave those justices campaign contributions. Liptak & 
Roberts, supra note 44, at A1. Public confidence in judicial impartiality has also 
suffered as a result. In an important Justice at Stake study, 86% of those sur­
veyed expressed concern that “lawyers are the biggest campaign contributors to 
judicial candidates, and they often appear in court before judges they’ve given 
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nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the state supreme court in 2008 
and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm that contrib­
uted to the campaign of at least one of the justices.58 Likewise, an 
Illinois study concluded that 34% of the cases that the Illinois Su­
preme Court decided involved a contributor-litigant.59 This should 
come as no surprise, as the parties that are most likely to appear in 
front of the judge have the most interest in currying the judge’s favor 
with campaign contributions or independent expenditures.60 
Caperton61 itself is the prototypical example. When it came time 
to elect a justice to the West Virginia Supreme Court, Don Blanken­
ship, whose company is a frequent litigant in front of that court, was 
the biggest spender.62 And despite Justice Kennedy’s repeated claims 
that Caperton is unique, extreme, and unusual, that is simply not the 
case. In fact, we have seen the Caperton situation repeat itself a num­
ber of times.63 
money to.” GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM. VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT 
STAKE  FREQUENCY  QUESTIONNAIRE 8 (2001), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/ 
69RB-9DZ8. 
58.	 Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributors and the Penn­
sylvania Supreme Court, 93 JUDICATURE 164, 164–65 (2010). Other surveys have 
concluded that in many states “nearly half of all supreme court cases involve 
someone who has given money to one or more of the judges hearing the case.” 
James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Cam­
paign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 749 (2011); 
Anthony J. Delligatti, A Horse of a Different Color: Distinguishing the Judiciary 
from the Political Branches in Campaign Financing, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 401, 436 
(2012). 
59.	 Ronald D. Rotunda, A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry into the Connection Be­
tween Judicial Decision Making and Campaign Contributions to Judicial Candi­
dates, PROF. LAW., Winter 2003, at 16, 17. 
60.	 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the Court appeared to 
recognize that the independent expenditures, like direct contributions, by one of 
the litigants to help a judge’s campaign could create an intolerable probability of 
bias. In fact, the Court repeatedly referred to the independent expenditures in 
the case as “contributions.” Id. at 884–86. This blurring surprised election law 
scholars because the Court, since Buckley v. Valeo, had sustained a bright-line 
distinction between the two. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976) (rec­
ognizing a constitutionally significant difference between independent expendi­
tures and direct campaign contributions). Although the Caperton Court does not 
expressly recognize that independent expenditures in judicial elections are inher­
ently corrupting, in the sense that they could be banned consistent with the First 
Amendment, the Court appears to acknowledge that “there are circumstances in 
which independent expenditures have the same potential to corruptly influence 
the actions of elected officials as contributions.” Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 
96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1656 (2012). 
61.	 556 U.S. 868. 
62.	 Id. at 873. 
63.	 For example, just a few years earlier, the Illinois Supreme Court heard Avery v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). Avery 
was an appeal of a $1 billion verdict against State Farm. While the case was 
pending, Illinois held its election for a seat on the state supreme court. The can­
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Common sense tells us that a judge hearing a case involving a con­
tributor would feel a debt of gratitude towards that individual. In­
deed, to feel otherwise would defy bedrock social norms.64 In other 
words, even if the judge was not consciously trying to rule in favor of a 
contributor, the judge may subconsciously feel an obligation to return 
the contributor’s favor. 
In addition, the next election is always just around the corner. 
Elected state court judges generally serve shorter terms than ap­
pointed judges. This is particularly true of lower state court judges, 
who typically serve relatively short (4–8 year) terms.65 This means 
that elected judges must always consider whether the same contribu­
tor would support his or her next election bid. And, given the recent 
trend in spending on judicial elections, that election bid is likely to be 
more expensive than the last one. Even judges don’t deny “that the 
knowledge of the identity of a contributor is always ‘in the back of the 
mind of the successful candidate.’”66 
Ruling in favor of those who have helped you in the past is bad 
enough. But elected judges must also make sure potential contribu­
tors are satisfied with the judge’s work on the bench. Every litigant 
and every lawyer is either a promising friend or burgeoning foe in the 
didates for that seat received a record $9.3 million in campaign contributions. 
JAMES  SAMPLE, DAVID  POZEN & MICHAEL  YOUNG, BRENNAN  CTR. FOR  JUSTICE, 
FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS, 21 (2008). Lloyd Karmeier won the 
election, having received hundreds of thousands of dollars in contributions from 
State Farm employees and lawyers. He then cast the deciding vote to overturn 
the verdict against State Farm. The United States Supreme Court denied certio­
rari. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006). Two other 
incidents involving the Ohio Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court 
are described by Roy Schotland in Comment on Professor Carrington’s Article, 
“The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio,” 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2002). 
64.	 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882 (“Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice 
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his ex­
traordinary efforts to get him elected.”); Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial, 
and the Appearance of Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influ­
ence of Campaign Contributions on Judges’ Decisions, 26 J.L. & POL. 359, 366 
(2011) (discussing the “reciprocity principle,” which is the notion that once an 
individual benefits from an action of another, it is expected that the recipient of 
the benefit return the favor). 
65.	 See Roy A. Schotland, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Should Judges be 
More Like Politicians?, JUDGES J., Summer 2002, at 7, 10 (discussing the effect of 
short terms for judges on judicial independence). For an excellent discussion on 
the interrelationship between judicial independence, accountability, and the 
length of judicial terms, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long 
Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 
1349 (2010). 
66.	 Banner, supra note 42, at 452–55. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
876	 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:862 
election just around the corner.67 In a survey of nearly 2,500 state 
judges, almost half (46%) expressed “a belief that campaign contribu­
tions influence judges’ decisions.”68 More than 70% of these judges 
“expressed concern regarding the fact that ‘[i]n some states, nearly 
half of all supreme court cases involve someone who has given money 
to one or more of the judges hearing the case.’”69 
2.	 Keeping the Electorate Happy 
In an influential 1995 article, Professor Steven Croley coined the 
term “majoritarian difficulty.”70 The difficulty is this: an elected judge 
may be tempted to resolve a case according to the preferences of the 
majority (i.e., the people that will decide whether the judge remains in 
the job), even if doing so is contrary to the law.71  This means that the 
unpopular litigant might lose the case because the judge might be 
worried about how the case will affect his reelection odds. To keep his 
job, the judge must anticipate how voters will react to a decision, and 
whether ruling in favor of a certain litigant will cost the judge votes at 
the polls. 
As with money, the majoritarian difficulty was at one time only 
difficult in theory. When judicial elections were less salient, an 
elected judge had little to worry about.72 Incumbents often ran unop­
posed, and even when they faced a challenger, incumbents almost al­
67.	 No state elects judges for life, meaning that for elected judges who do not plan to 
retire or step down from the bench, another election is always in the back (or the 
front) of their minds. This is particularly true of lower state court judges, who 
typically serve relatively short (4–8 years) terms. See supra note 65 and accom­
panying text. 
68.	 Sample, supra note 58, at 749. 
69.	 Id. (quoting GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM. VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE 
AT STAKE—STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 9 (2002), archived at http:/ 
/perma.unl.edu/5RUS-YT7Y). 
70.	 Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995). The majoritarian difficulty is the 
counter to Alexander Bickel’s famous countermajoritarian difficulty, which has 
been at the heart of all constitutional theory. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); see also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Aca­
demic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 
112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
71.	 Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 
96 VA. L. REV. 719, 731 (2010) (“[E]lective judiciaries pose a risk to the rule of 
law, which is compromised whenever a judge’s ruling is influenced by majority 
preferences.”). 
72.	 Of course, every judge might be concerned about public perception of the judge’s 
work product, including federal judges who are appointed for life. See Robert A. 
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a Na­
tional Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and 
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586 (1993) (“[C]ourts do not trump major­
ity will, or remain unaccountable to majority sentiment, nearly to the extent usu­
ally depicted.”). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CIVIL JURY IN A WORLD WITHOUT TRIALS 877 
ways won.73 Unlike elections for other elected office, judges felt safe 
in their job, knowing that they were out of any public limelight. 
That has all changed in recent years. As judicial elections have 
become more competitive, individual rulings face closer scrutiny—and 
pose a greater risk to a judge’s career.74 As Justice Otto Klaus fa­
mously remarked, “There’s no way a judge is going to be able to ignore 
the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or she 
has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring a 
crocodile in your bathtub.”75 In recent years, a number of judges have 
either lost elections as a result of unpopular decisions, or squeaked out 
narrow victories after their opponents used unpopular decisions 
against them. Most recently, three justices of the Iowa Supreme 
Court were voted out of office in a retention election for their contro­
versial decision to strike down a state statute defining marriage as 
between a man and a woman.76 On average, of course, incumbents 
are still likely to win their reelection, but the job is no longer a safe 
one for a sitting judge.77 And as judicial elections become more and 
more competitive, pressures to appease and impress the electorate 
will continue to increase. 
73.	 David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2047, 2051 (2010) (“Under the traditional model of judicial elec­
tions . . . incumbents almost always won . . . .”). 
74.	 See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in 
RUNNING FOR  JUDGE: THE  RISING  POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND  LEGAL  STAKES OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73, 75 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (“Sitting judges facing an 
imminent election . . . know that every decision is potentially fodder for the oppo­
sition. When well-heeled or well-organized interest groups can seize on isolated 
opinions—even well-reasoned decisions that have been joined by a majority of 
other judges on the court—as the basis for attack ads in the next campaign, it 
takes extraordinary integrity and real courage for a judge facing reelection to 
support a ruling that plainly will be unpopular.”); Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, 
Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 27, 33 (2011) (“[P]ast judicial elections have taught that 
justices can be ousted due to their vote in a single case on one of these topics, 
often a vote portrayed incorrectly or deceptively by the opposition campaign or 
interest group.”). 
75.	 Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, at 52, 58. 
76.	 See Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three 
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715 (2011); see also Whitney Woodward, 2010 Justice 
Kilbride Retention in Illinois, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 843 (2012) (describing Illinois 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Kilbride’s victory); Press Release, Justice at 
Stake & Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Gay Marriage, Tax Fights Spark High-Profile 
Court Races (Sept. 23, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/EB4V-VSDG (dis­
cussing relatively close races in Kansas and Colorado). 
77.	 Some estimate the judicial election races are now at least as competitive as races 
for the U.S. House of Representatives. See Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme 
Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 315, 319 (2001) (“The fact of the matter . . . is that supreme court 
justices face competition that is, by two of three measures, equivalent if not 
higher to that for the U.S. House.”). 
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Groups and individuals that are unpopular with the local electo­
rate are the biggest victims of the majoritarian difficulty. For exam­
ple, studies show that judges are biased against out-of-state 
defendants. One study demonstrated that the average damages 
award in a civil case was $150,000 higher against out-of-state defend­
ants.78 Of course, this redistribution of wealth to in-state litigants is 
entirely rational—taking care of the local donors and voters takes pri­
ority.79  In the words of West Virginia Justice Richard Neely, “As long 
as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to 
injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. . . . [M]y my job 
security [is enhanced] because the in-state plaintiffs, their families, 
and their friends will reelect me.”80 
Another unpopular group is criminal defendants, and they, too, fall 
victim to the majoritarian difficulty. As judicial elections approach, 
elected judges tend to sentence criminal defendants more harshly.81 
And when that sentence is the death penalty, an elected judge is much 
more likely to sentence a defendant to death when judicial elections 
are close.82 One study found that “criminal defendants [convicted of 
murder] were approximately 15% more likely to be sentenced to death 
when the sentence was issued during the judge’s election year.”83 
This, too, comes as no surprise as criminal justice issues figure promi­
nently in contested judicial elections.84 In the words of Ninth Circuit 
Judge Alex Kozinski: 
While many, perhaps, most judges resist the pressure and remain impartial, 
the fact that they may have to face the voters with the combined might of the 
prosecution and police groups aligned against them no doubt causes some 
78.	 Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort 
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 162–63 (1999) (concluding that elected judges fre­
quently redistribute wealth from out-of-state defendants to in-state plaintiffs). 
79.	 Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial 
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 289 
(2002) (“[A]n elected judge may rationally favor in-state plaintiffs, who vote and 
have friends and relatives who vote, over out-of-state corporations.”). 
80.	 RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988). 
81.	 See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Jus­
tice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) (“[A]ll 
judges, even the most punitive, increase their sentences as reelection 
nears . . . .”). 
82.	 Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002). 
83.	 Id. 
84.	 Croley, supra note 70, at 737–39 (citing an increase in the number of elections 
where an incumbent judge loses because of criminal justice issues); cf. Kyle D. 
Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections: Lessons from a Bell­
wether State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2003) (explaining that even 
advocates of tort reform frequently pay for appeals to criminal justice issues be­
cause those issues are more salient for voters). 
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judges to rule for the prosecution in cases where they would otherwise have 
ruled for the defense.85 
And regardless of the type of case, empirical evidence seems to sup­
port the intuition of the majoritarian difficulty. A number of studies 
by Joanna Shepherd and others demonstrate that elected judges tend 
to decide cases at least partly in accordance with the preference of the 
electorate.86 According to Shepherd, “[W]hen judges face [conserva­
tive electorates] in partisan reelections, they are more likely to [rule] 
for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor disputes, for 
doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, for businesses in 
products liability cases, for original defendants in tort cases, and 
against criminals in criminal appeals.”87 Admittedly, every judge 
without life tenure must consider retention politics,88 but elected 
judges do it at a significantly higher level than appointed judges. And 
with good reason: their jobs depend on it. 
3.	 Perception of Bias 
So far, we’ve only discussed evidence of real bias. But there is an­
other kind of bias that arises as a result of modern judicial elections: 
the appearance of bias. The legitimacy of our justice system relies in 
large part on public perception of impartiality—“[P]ublic perception of 
the courts as impartial . . . is essential to the effective operation of the 
judicial process.”89 In the words of Justice Kennedy, “[T]he law com­
mands allegiance only if it commands respect. It commands respect 
only if the public thinks the judges are neutral.”90 
Three relevant groups also believe that the electoral process influ­
ences judicial decisions. First, judges confirm they take electoral con­
siderations into account when making legal judgments.91 In one 
85.	 Hon. Alex Kozinski, Preface, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC. iii, xxxviii-xxxix (2015). 
86.	 Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 169, 169 (2009) (“The evidence supports the widespread belief that 
judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected.”) 
87.	 See Shepherd, supra note 47, at 661. 
88.	 Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589 
(2009). In other words, even judges who are reappointed by the governor or the 
state legislature seem to exhibit biases towards those reappointing agents. 
89.	 DUBOIS, supra note 37, at 21–22. 
90.	 Peter A. Joy, Insulation Needed for Elected Judges, 22 NAT’L L.J., Jan. 10, 2000, 
at A19, A19 (quoting Justice Anthony Kennedy, Interview by Bill Moyers with 
Justices Stephen Breyer and Anthony Kennedy, archived at http://  
perma.unl.edu/WH9U-NN9W). 
91.	 See Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Ju­
diciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
839, 842 (1994) (“Judges admit that they cannot completely trust themselves to 
hold in check the threats to their independence presented by judicial elections.”); 
Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 
JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994) (“[E]ven though judges rarely lose retention elections 
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study, more than 25% of the respondents believed that contributions 
have at least “some influence” on judicial decisions; approximately 
50% thought the contributions have at least “a little influence.”92 
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul E. Pfeifer nicely summarized how 
judges feel. He said, “I never felt so much like a hooker down by the 
bus station in any race I’ve ever been in as I did in a judicial race. 
Everyone interested in contributing has very specific interests. They 
mean to be buying a vote.”93 Second, the contributors believe that 
their contributions make a difference.94 In the words of an anony­
mous AFL-CIO official, “[I]t’s easier to elect seven judges than to elect 
132 legislators.”95 And finally, approximately 80% of the public 
thought judges were biased in favor of their contributors.96 A similar 
percentage thought that judicial decisions were influenced by political 
considerations.97 While these surveys do not alone prove that judges 
are indeed biased, they show that judicial elections create a strong 
appearance of bias, and that in and of itself is a problem for the 
judiciary.98 
C. Failed Solutions 
While this evidence may seem shocking at first, none of it comes as 
a surprise to judicial-selection scholars. For many years, academics 
have recognized the potential for bias that results from the judicial 
selection and retention process. Some scholars have even argued that 
judicial elections are unconstitutional precisely because of these con­
cerns.99 After all, the Constitution guarantees impartial judges100 
and only 34.9% believe a poor judge will be voted out, still three-fifths believe 
judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judicial behavior.”). 
92.	 GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM. VIEWPOINT, supra note 69, at 5. 
93.	 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 44, at A1. 
94.	 ADAM  SKAGGS, BUYING  JUSTICE: THE  IMPACT OF CITIZENS  UNITED ON  JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 4–7 (2010) (summarizing evidence demonstrating that judicial cam­
paign contributors believe that their spending influences judicial decisions). 
95.	 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 54, at 9. 
96.	 Geyh, supra note 1. 
97.	 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 
NATIONAL SURVEY 41 (1999), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RW5W-U5X3; see 
also Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword to SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 54, at i, i (“We 
all expect judges to be accountable to the law rather than political supporters or 
special interests. But elected judges in many states are compelled to solicit 
money for their election campaigns, sometimes from lawyers and parties appear­
ing before them. . . . [This leads to] a crisis of confidence in the impartiality of the 
judiciary.”). 
98.	 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The gov­
ernmental interest in an independent and impartial judiciary is matched by its 
equally important interest in preserving public confidence in that independence 
and impartiality.”), rev’d, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
99.	 Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State 
Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular 
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and an unbiased, neutral adjudication “on the basis of the facts and 
law of their individual cases.”101 Without a fair, impartial judge, all 
other constitutional safeguards are rendered meaningless102 and the 
judiciary’s legitimacy suffers. None of our other rights—and laws— 
matter if the judges enforcing those rights are not impartial. 
Three major solutions have been offered to address the problem. 
These solutions include eliminating judicial elections, reforming judi­
cial elections, and enhancing judicial recusal rules. But these solu­
tions have failed for a number of different reasons: because they are 
poorly suited to address the problem, because they are highly unpopu­
lar with the public, or because they have been held—or are likely to be 
held—unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
1. Eliminating Elections 
A favorite pastime of judicial selection scholars is critiquing judi­
cial elections.103 As David Pozen has observed, “disdain for elective 
judiciaries” is the dominant theme of the legal literature on judicial 
selection.104 In the words of Roy Schotland, “[M]ore sweat and ink 
have been spent on getting rid of judicial elections than on any other 
Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (2014); Martin H. Redish & Law­
rence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498 (1986) (“[I]n [at least some cases], the use of non­
tenured state judges seems to be a clear violation of procedural due process.”). 
100.	 In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to an 
impartial jurist is central to due process. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 
(1927); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). 
101.	 Redish & Aronoff, supra note 99, at 9; see also Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (holding 
that the presence of a judge with an interest in the outcome of the case violates 
due process); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality 
and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 610 (2002) (“Judicial 
impartiality is one of the core elements of due process.”). 
102.	 Redish & Marshall, supra note 99, at 457, 479 (observing that procedural due 
process requires a neutral adjudicator). Professors Redish and Marshall explain 
that “[t]he rights to notice, hearing, counsel, transcript, and to calling and cross-
examining witnesses . . . are of no real value . . . if the decisionmaker bases his 
findings on factors other than his assessment of the evidence before him.” Id. at 
476. 
103.	 See generally Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 2596, 2604 (2003); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Inde­
pendence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 41 (2003) (“There is wide­
spread dissatisfaction today with the operation of judicial elections.”). The 
support for judicial elections largely comes from political scientists rather than 
lawyers and law professors. See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, 
IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009). 
104.	 Pozen, supra note 52, at 278. There is a rich body of scholarship evaluating dif­
ferent judicial selection and retention mechanisms. It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to summarize that scholarship, but it overwhelmingly concludes that judi­
cial elections are a poor way of selecting judges. 
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single subject in the history of American law.”105 Thousands of arti­
cles criticize judicial elections for a wide range of reasons106: because 
they are unseemly,107 because they discourage the best candidates 
from running,108 or because they threaten judicial independence109 
and judicial impartiality.110 
And the academics are not alone. In response to many of the con­
cerns discussed earlier, the American Bar Association has called on 
states to end the practice of electing judges entirely.111 Instead, the 
ABA recommends that governors appoint judges to serve a single term 
until a specified age.112 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has also been 
the public face of the campaign against judicial elections.113 Although 
O’Connor is an opponent of all judicial elections, she has taken a more 
moderate position, calling for states to replace contested judicial elec­
tions with the merit-selection scheme.114 And this is just the “tip of 
105.	 Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998). 
106.	 There are a few exceptions. For example, Michael Dimino has argued that while 
judicial elections are not perfect, neither are the other methods of judicial selec­
tion, suggesting judicial elections are the best way of selecting judges. See 
Michael Dimino, The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All the Others That 
Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267 (2005). Leading defenders of judicial 
elections are Melinda Gann Hall and Chris Bonneau. See BONNEAU & HALL, 
supra note 103. 
107.	 Croley, supra note 70, at 69 n.22. 
108.	 See, e.g., Harold Laski, The Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 
529, 531–32 (1926) (arguing that the most qualified candidates may shy away 
from running for office, causing the public to rarely choose the best qualified 
candidates). 
109.	 Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Inde­
pendence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367 (2002). 
110.	 Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 COR­
NELL L. REV. 191, 233 (2012). 
111.	 See Jessica Leval Mener, The Aftermath of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission: Preventing Impropriety While Encouraging the Free Flow of Infor­
mation in Judicial Elections, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 713, 730 (2011) (discussing 
the “ABA’s mission to end judicial elections”). 
112.	 No state currently uses exactly such a system. Rhode Island is the only state that 
grants judges life tenure. Two others—Massachusetts and New Hampshire—re­
quire judges to retire when they reach a mandatory retirement age. See Judicial 
Selection in the States, NAT’L  CTR. FOR  STATE  COURTS, http:// 
www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.unl.edu/5SD9-TTWS (describing the selection methodology for each state). 
113.	 Other judges and Justices have criticized judicial elections. See, e.g., Justice 
John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address, American Bar Association An­
nual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, August 3, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL  COM­
MENT. 21, 30–31 (1996) (criticizing judicial elections); Chief Justice Margaret H. 
Marshall, President of the Conference of Chief Justices, Remarks to the Ameri­
can Bar Association House of Delegates (Feb. 16, 2009) (judicial elections are the 
“single greatest threat to judicial independence”), archived at http://  
perma.unl.edu/F92S-7MCF. 
114.	 See supra section II.A (discussing merit-based selection). 
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the iceberg of the opposition to judicial elections.”115 The list of elec­
tion opponents is long and filled with current and former legal law­
yers, judges, and politicians. 
Some scholars have gone beyond merely criticizing judicial elec­
tions to in fact argue that such elections are unconstitutional. For ex­
ample, Aviva Abramovsky argued that the only way to restore judicial 
impartiality, at least in the post-Citizens United world, is to end judi­
cial elections.116 Likewise, Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that judi­
cial elections are inconsistent with the idea of judicial impartiality 
and the rule of law.117 In recent years, arguments that judicial elec­
tions are unconstitutional have gained some traction. To ensure fair 
and impartial judges, as required by the Due Process Clause, Martin 
Redish and Jennifer Aronoff argue that “life tenure, or, at the very 
least, some form of formal term limit is required.”118 Lawyers have 
also essayed to make similar arguments in legal briefs, albeit with no 
success.119 
Sitting judges, too, have also spoken out against judicial elec­
tions.120 In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justices Gins­
burg and Stevens stopped short of declaring judicial elections 
unconstitutional, but their views on judicial elections are clear. In her 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the announce clause, which the 
Court upheld, is constitutional because due process would be denied if 
an elected judge sat in a case involving an issue on which he had pre­
viously announced his view.121 Such a judge would have a “direct, 
personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest” in ruling consistently 
with his previously announced view to minimize the risk that the 
judge would lose his job.122 
With all these voices simultaneously opposing judicial elections, 
one would think that eliminating elections would be a simple task. 
115.	 MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES 1 (2015). 
116.	 See, e.g., Aviva Abramovsky, Justice for Sale: Contemplations on the “Impartial” 
Judge in a Citizens United World, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 713, 717 (2012) 
(“[T]here are only two legitimate societal choices available, accept the entrance of 
a pervasive, increasingly powerful influence on judges and its corollary of ever 
decreasing faith of the public in judges, or end judicial elections entirely.”). 
117.	 Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 
1988 (1988) (“[R]ule of law requires that judges decide cases based on their views 
of the legal merits, not based on what will please voters.”). 
118.	 Redish & Aronoff, supra note 99, at 2; see Redish & Marshall, supra note 99, at 
498 (“[T]he use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear violation of proce­
dural due process” in at least some cases). 
119.	 See, e.g., Brief for Idaho Conservation League and Louisiana Environmental Ac­
tion Network as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Side at 24–30, Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521). 
120.	 Justice O’Connor is at the forefront of that movement. 
121.	 See generally White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
122.	 Id. 
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But one group overwhelmingly favors judicial elections, and it is the 
one group that matters most: the people themselves. Despite their 
concerns about biased elected judges,123 approximately 80% of the 
public supports judicial elections.124 Recent efforts to move away 
from judicial elections have failed.125 In fact, since judicial elections 
came to be the dominant form of judicial selection in the nineteenth 
century, no state has abandoned judicial elections to revert to a purely 
appointive system.126 Doing so would require voters to deprive them­
selves of the right to vote, and that is not likely to happen. And al­
though there is nothing illogical about a hybrid system of judicial 
elections followed by a single long term, or perhaps even life tenure,127 
the electorate seems uninterested in retaining the power to elect 
judges while abandoning power to hold those judges accountable for 
their decisions in office. 
Not only has the movement to eliminate judicial elections failed to 
gain traction with the public, but the Court does not seem sympathetic 
to arguments that judicial elections are unconstitutional, either. In 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Scalia preemptively 
rejected any such arguments. Justice Scalia wrote: 
[If] it violates due process for a judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way 
rather than another increases his prospects for reelection, then—quite sim­
ply—the practice of electing judges is itself a violation of due pro­
cess. . . . [These views] are not, however, the views reflected in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has coexisted with the 
election of judges ever since it was adopted.128 
It is clear, therefore, that judicial elections are not going away.129 
If we are going to solve the problem of biased judges then it will not be 
by eliminating judicial elections, but rather by correcting for the bi­
ases that such elections create. 
123.	 Geyh, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that 80% of the electorate believes that elected 
judges are biased in favor of those campaign contributors who helped the judges’ 
election campaign). 
124.	 Id. at 72; Hall, supra note 34, at 73. 
125.	 See, e.g., Chris W. Bonneau, Op-Ed., Why We Should Keep Judicial Elections, 
WASH. POST (May 26, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we­
should-keep-judicial-elections/2011/05/26/AGt08HCH_story.html, archived at 
http://perma.unl.edu/X9PG-7CS8 (describing Justice O’Connor’s failed effort in 
Nevada to eliminate the practice of partisan judicial elections). 
126.	 In the last sixty years, twelve states abandoned partisan elections in favor of non­
partisan elections and merit selection (which includes retention elections). Six 
other states abandoned non-partisan elections, again in favor of merit selection. 
HALL, supra note 115, at 7. 
127.	 The most prominent proponent of such an approach is Professor Michael Dimino. 
See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 451, 457 (2008). 
128.	 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782–83 (2002). 
129.	 Frost & Lindquist, supra note 71, at 721 (“[E]lected judges are here to stay.”). 
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2. Election Reform 
Recognizing that the fight to eliminate judicial elections is a lost 
cause, some have suggested that judicial elections can at least be 
transformed to reduce or eliminate the factors that lead to judicial 
bias. For example, to address the concern that elected judges favor 
their contributors, some have sought to shepherd in a system of public 
funding for judicial elections, greater restrictions on campaign contri­
butions to judicial candidates, and more robust disclosure of campaign 
contributions.130 To address the concern that judges tailor their deci­
sions to the preferences of the electorate, reformers have suggested 
providing voter information pamphlets,131 including more information 
on the ballot,132 and a greater regulation and monitoring of judicial 
campaign conduct.133 
The primary goal of these reforms is to ease, if not eliminate, some 
of the electoral pressure that judges feel as a result of: (1) facing the 
electorate to keep their jobs, and (2) deciding cases involving their con­
tributors. The good news is that when it comes to this type of reform, 
the people are no longer an impediment, as many see the electoral 
system as broken—maybe even corrupt.134 The bad news is that 
there is another impediment: the Supreme Court. 
If a major problem regarding judicial bias is the presence of money, 
then perhaps the solution is to get the money out of the system. But 
most campaign-financing efforts have been decimated by recent Court 
decisions. For example, some states have experimented with public 
financing of judicial elections,135 but at the core of such a system is a 
matching funds provision. A matching funds provision is necessary to 
ensure that if one candidate opts out of public financing and accepts 
contributions from donors, the other candidate can still run a competi­
tive race by obtaining matching funds from the state. Without match­
ing funds, public financing schemes fall apart.136 In Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club, the Supreme Court eviscerated such provisions, hold­
130.	 Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1483, 1515 (2005). 
131.	 David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial 
Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 
115, 129–30 (2008). 
132.	 Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553, 555 
(2014). 
133.	 The idea here is that judges are more likely to rule in favor of the preferences of 
the electorate when they have promised the electorate to rule a certain way in the 
court during their campaign for office. 
134.	 See Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices 
for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 168 (2007). 
135.	 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1 (LexisNexis 2013). 
136.	 Scott W. Gaylord, Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court’s Proper Support of 
Judicial Elections, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1521, 1547 (2011) (“Given that candi­
dates and corporations can spend their own money without limit, public financing 
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ing that they violate the First Amendment, and essentially taking 
public financing off the table as a means to curb the influence of 
money in judicial elections.137 For example, North Carolina recently 
experimented with public financing for judicial elections. The experi­
ment was largely unsuccessful as many candidates simply chose to opt 
out of the system, and the Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club severely limited the states’ ability to reward those individuals 
who opted into the system.138 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also clarified that candi­
dates and corporations can spend their money without limit.139 Since 
the days of Buckley v. Valeo,140 states have had broad discretion to 
limit campaign contributions, but those limits are also under at­
tack.141  In any event, it is not the contributions that are the problem. 
Take Caperton: Burt Blankenship contributed only a few thousand 
dollars to Justice Benjamin’s campaign, but spent millions to get Jus­
tice Benjamin elected.142 When it comes to the gratitude that Justice 
Benjamin would feel toward Blankenship, there is no meaningful dif­
ference between contributions and expenditures that equally help Jus­
tice Benjamin get elected. 
Efforts to restrict candidates’ campaign speech have likewise been 
dealt severe blows. Many states have historically prohibited judicial 
candidates from announcing their positions on cases likely to come 
before them. But in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Su­
preme Court held that such bans also violate the First Amendment.143 
As a result, regulations on judicial speech and conduct are presump­
tively unconstitutional. Judges now frequently hit the campaign trail, 
discussing their positions on issues they are likely to see once on the 
bench, with the concomitant pressure to live up to those promises once 
on the bench.144 
These reform efforts also suffer from a theoretical concern: why 
elect judges at all if we are going to regulate judicial elections in a way 
is necessary, but it is an attractive option to candidates only if they can receive 
matching funds to keep pace with their privately funded rivals.”) 
137.	 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
138.	 Id. 
139.	 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding 
that the First Amendment prohibits restrictions on independent expenditures by 
a nonprofit corporation). 
140.	 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
141.	 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating aggre­
gate contribution limits by holding they violate the First Amendment). 
142.	 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009). 
143.	 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
144.	 See Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, 
Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010) (highlighting numerous in­
stances of promises to be tough on crime that judges make in the course of their 
campaign). 
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that limits the candidates’ ability to convey their message to the pub­
lic and limits lawyers’ and litigants’ ability to inform the electorate 
about potentially erroneous decisions for which judges should be held 
accountable. The public is already relatively uninformed about judi­
cial candidates and making it more difficult for judges (and others) to 
inform the voters seems counterintuitive to how we usually approach 
elections. Without judicial campaign speech and extensive (and ex­
pensive) advertising, voters are left in the dark. This forces voters to 
rely on cues that are entirely irrelevant, like candidates’ names, or 
cues that make little sense in an election for a state trial judge, like 
party affiliations.145 So while campaign contributions, expenditures, 
and promises to decide cases a certain way make judges more biased, 
they also make judicial elections more legitimate.146 
3. Recusal 
But what about recusal? After all, recusal is at the core of judicial 
ethics codes147 and state recusal statutes,148 and is at the heart of our 
current approach to the problem of judicial bias.149 Under the Rules 
of Judicial Conduct in every state, a biased judge (or even one who 
appears to be biased) must step aside.150 And even if judicial elections 
lead to judicial bias, perhaps those biased judges can, ex post, be pro­
hibited from hearing certain cases. 
Scholars have suggested that recusal is a potentially viable solu­
tion to the problem of judicial bias. Some have argued that recusal is 
“the only effective means to ensure the impartiality of elected 
145.	 Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the Mo­
ment May Decide Your Future, 18 J.L. & POL. 643, 690 (2002) (describing the 
importance of name recognition and ballot position and their impact on the likeli­
hood of electoral success for a judicial candidate). 
146.	 See Pozen, supra note 52 (describing this irony). 
147.	 See, e.g., CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); N.M. CODE OF JUDI­
CIAL CONDUCT, R. 21-400 (2004). 
148.	 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-39 (2012); LA. CODE  CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 151 
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (2003). 
149.	 There is, perhaps, one other alternative: educating the electorate about the judi­
cial role and educating judges about bias, including unconscious and subcon­
scious bias. See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as 
the Fundamental Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis,” 99 
KY. L.J. 259, 295–324 (2011) (suggesting such strategies). I, too, have written 
about creating a more informed electorate, with the hope that this would lead 
judges to be less fearful about losing their jobs based on individual unpopular 
decisions. See Bam, supra note 132. While I continue to believe these efforts are 
important, such efforts permit the sources of bias to continue and are unlikely to 
be entirely adequate. 
150.	 See, e.g., TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2002); see generally Gabriel 
D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38 
PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1151–73 (2011) (reviewing the recusal codes and statutes in 
all fifty states). 
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judges,”151 and that “recusal reform offers an effective, constitutional 
means of solving” the judicial bias problem that results from judicial 
elections.152 In fact, recusal can arguably be “precisely targeted to 
preventing due process problems . . . without restricting campaign 
speech at all.”153 In the last decade, and especially since Caperton, 
recusal has been a frequent topic in law journals. 
Judges, too, have suggested that recusal can be a remedy to the 
election-related bias problem. In his Republican Party v. White con­
currence, Justice Kennedy endorsed more stringent recusal standards 
as one acceptable means of preserving judicial impartiality.154 In 
other words, to the extent that judicial campaigning endorsed by the 
Court’s decision in White creates either bias or the appearance of bias, 
Justice Kennedy explained that stricter recusal standards can elimi­
nate that problem. Lower court judges have followed suit,155 sug­
gesting that even if judicial elections lead to judicial bias, recusal 
ensures that an impartial arbiter will hear the case. 
This focus on recusal is not surprising. Recusal has tremendous 
allure because, at least in theory, it allows us to ensure judicial impar­
tiality at the point of delivery. If recusal works to remedy election-
related judicial bias, then states can continue with the practice of judi­
cial elections with no concern about election-related bias influencing 
judicial decision-making. But, for two reasons, recusal does not work. 
a. Self-Recusal Procedure Is Inadequate 
One important reason why recusal has failed is the self-recusal 
procedure. In most states, as in the federal courts, judges decide their 
own recusal motions.156 This recusal procedure has been followed 
throughout the United States since the country’s founding, and was 
151.	 McLucas, supra note 14, at 692 (emphasis added). 
152.	 Stott, supra note 14, at 482; see also Mark Andrew Grannis, Safeguarding the 
Litigant’s Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process 
Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from 
Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 415 (1987) (explaining that recusal is “a manage­
able solution to the problem of possible judicial bias”). 
153.	 Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Re­
sponse to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 568–70 (2004). 
154.	 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
155.	 See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 763 F. Supp. 
128, 137 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (contending that judges whose impartiality could be 
questioned because of campaign promises could be required to recuse themselves 
under the state code of judicial conduct); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. 
Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 702 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (same). 
156.	 Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might Rea­
sonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 
448 (2014). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2016] CIVIL JURY IN A WORLD WITHOUT TRIALS 889 
followed in England for centuries before that.157 While there are some 
exceptions, the judge’s decision is final, subject only to appellate re­
view. That appellate review, however, is generally highly deferential 
to the judge’s decision, and reversals are rare.158 
This self-recusal procedure is particularly inappropriate when it 
comes to addressing election-related judicial bias for several reasons. 
First, in the course of their campaigns, candidates for judicial office 
make all sorts of statements, announcements, and promises.159 In the 
next election, voters are likely to expect the judge to have some record 
as to the category of cases where the judge made promises before. As 
a result, one might expect judges to hesitate before disqualifying 
themselves from cases involving issues about which they had cam­
paigned (and, presumably, the issues that voters care about most).160 
Judges who recuse themselves from the cases voters care about most 
might find themselves out of a job.161 
157.	 See John A. Meiser, The (Non) Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judicial 
Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799, 1803 (2009) (“[O]ur recusal proce­
dures grew out of English common law practice.”). 
158.	 Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of the Judiciary, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
1951, 1990 (2013) (“[S]elf-recusal decisions are reviewed deferentially and rarely 
reversed on appeal . . . .”). 
159.	 Frost & Lindquist, supra note 71, at 734 (describing the efforts of special interest 
groups to obtain judicial disclosure of their views and positions on contested 
issues). 
160.	 See James Layman, Judicial Campaign Speech Regulation: Integrity or Incen­
tives?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 769, 775 (2006) (“[I]f a judge is required to recuse 
himself on all issues related to his campaign promises, “the voters do not get 
what they believe they were promised.” (citations omitted)). While there have 
been few studies of voter expectations in judicial elections, studies of candidates 
running for office in other elections suggest that those candidates expect voters to 
evaluate them based on their record in office. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF 
CONGRESSIONAL  ACTION 72–76 (1990) (arguing that voters evaluate the 
probability that a candidate will choose a voter-preferred policy based on an eval­
uation of the candidate’s records). 
161.	 In fact, some have argued that requiring recusal under these circumstances un­
dermines the purpose of judicial elections. Why have elections, the argument 
goes, if any substantive information that a candidate can provide to a voter about 
what they would do when in office disables the judge from doing what they prom­
ised? According to some scholars, providing voters with information about a 
judge, and then requiring the judge who provided the information to recuse from 
those cases, “work[s] a fraud on the voters.” Randall T. Shepard, Campaign 
Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 1059, 1076 
(1996); see also Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3 FIRST AMENDMENT L. 
REV. 5, 63–75 (2004) (arguing that mandatory recusal rules might run afoul of 
First Amendment); Andrea Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and 
Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977, 1013 (2011) (“If 
recusal burdens speech, then affording too much weight to a litigant’s due process 
rights may infringe upon the presiding judge’s right to speak outside the court­
room, including on the campaign trail, thus harming the marketplace of ideas.”). 
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The second reason why the self-recusal procedure is ill-suited to 
addressing election-related judicial bias is that judges might feel that 
recusing themselves for their campaign statements and conduct would 
imply that the campaigning itself had been improper. In addition, the 
ethics codes require judges to recuse sua sponte, meaning that recusal 
motions put judges in a difficult spot: “[A] successful motion to recuse 
requires the [judge] to admit that he failed in the first instance to ad­
here to statutory and ethical requirements.”162 Even an unbiased 
judge may worry that a recusal sends a message that he is biased.163 
Third, the self-recusal procedure is the least effective precisely 
when it is needed most. Take, for example, the situation where a 
judge is biased in favor of a financial contributor to the judge’s previ­
ous election.164 Recusal eliminates the judge’s ability to repay his 
debt of gratitude.165 And if a judge does recuse himself in every case 
involving that contributor, that contributor is likely to take his money 
elsewhere. As a result, the more biased the target judge is, the less 
likely that judge is to recuse himself.166 In fact, in a study of judicial 
voting by the Ohio Supreme Court, the New York Times found that in 
“the 215 cases with the most direct potential conflicts of interest, jus­
tices recused themselves just 9 times.”167 
Moreover, judges rarely recognize their own biases, or even the ap­
pearance of bias, because such bias is often subconscious.168 Take 
Caperton’s Justice Benjamin: he was convinced that he was not bi­
ased, and presumably, since he did not recuse, that no one could per­
162.	 R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance 
& Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 
1833–34 (2005). 
163.	 James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More Rigorous, 46 
JUDGES J. 17, 20 (2007). 
164.	 Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 
699, 700 (1995) (“Ordinary rules of social interaction impose obligations of grati­
tude and loyalty on those who receive a significant benefit.”). 
165.	 In Caperton, the Supreme Court emphasized the debt of gratitude that Justice 
Benjamin owed to Bert Blankenship as one of the reasons recusal was required 
under the Due Process Clause. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 
882 (2009). 
166.	 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Ju­
dicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
167.	 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html, 
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J6SM-UBVY. 
168.	 See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1333 (2006) 
(“Because so many biases operate on subconscious levels, it is often difficult for 
individuals to gauge the factors that may skew judgment.”). The work of Jeffrey 
Rachlinkski, Andrew Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie has demonstrated that judges 
suffer from similar unconscious biases as the general population. See Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009). 
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ceive him as biased.169 Modern research in cognitive psychology tells 
us why—the cognitive biases that affect judicial decisions make it im­
possible for judges to assess their own conduct dispassionately and 
open-mindedly.170 Social science literature refers to this as the “Bias 
Blind Spot.”171 The Bias Blind Spot means that everyone, including 
judges, makes important decisions in a manner skewed to favor their 
own self-interest.172 As a result of this tendency, people tend to think 
they are better than they actually are at a number of different tasks 
and on a number of different criteria, including fairness and imparti­
ality.173 Judges are not immune: they overestimate their ability to 
remain impartial and ignore evidence of judicial bias.174 
And while shifting the recusal decision to another judge may fix 
the constitutional objections to the self-recusal procedure, such a shift 
is unlikely to be a panacea. Judges respect each other, and hesitate to 
impugn each other’s ability to remain impartial.175 Furthermore, no 
third party can decide whether another judge is actually biased with­
out a true adversarial process where both sides present evidence of 
their state of mind. Recusal is a dispute between a judge and a liti­
169.	 Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Dis­
qualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 235, 276 (2013) (“Justice Benjamin did what most of us do when evaluat­
ing our own biases—he succumbed to the Introspection Illusion, which confirmed 
his belief that he was not biased in this specific instance.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of Judicial 
Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 53–56 (2010) (discussing the standards ap­
plied, and conclusions reached, by Justice Benjamin). 
170.	 See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a 
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. 
REV. 913 (1999) (discussing unconscious bias); see also Robert A. Prentice, The 
Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litiga­
tion, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–80 (2000) (discussing self-serving bias). 
171.	 Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus 
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370 (2002). 
172.	 See Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 567, 568 (2003). 
173.	 See David Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others, 21 J. EXPER. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 480 (1985). 
174.	 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Ju­
diciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1477, 1519–20 (2009). Interestingly, judges are able to identify this bias in their 
colleagues, but not in themselves. Most judges simply see themselves as “above 
average.” Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 166, at 814–15. 
175.	 Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1237 (2002) (discussing the “resistance of other appellate 
judges to the idea of evaluating allegations of bias or prejudice against their col­
leagues”); Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias—The Stan­
dard Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 767 (1973) (“Many courts are 
understandably reluctant to disqualify a fellow judge since a finding of actual 
prejudice . . . impugns both that judge’s qualifications and those of the system he 
represents.”). 
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gant, and an adversarial process that allows those two sides to present 
their dispute to a neutral third party would be cumbersome and 
inefficient.176 
b. Every Judge Is Potentially Biased 
Admittedly, in some circumstances, recusal works well. For exam­
ple, recusal is perfectly suited for a situation where one can identify a 
specific source of bias from which a particular judge suffers. If the 
source of bias is unique to the judge in question—perhaps the judge 
owns stock in one of the corporate litigants, or has a close relationship 
with one of the parties, or has personal knowledge of the facts of the 
case—then recusal is a perfect fit.177 The sources of bias are objec­
tively identifiable, and other judges who do not suffer from the same 
biases may be found. Removing the biased judge from the case elimi­
nates the bias entirely.178 
But for election-related bias, things are not so simple. The 
majoritarian difficulty affects every state judge who must run for re­
election. No judge is safe from the threat of losing the next election. 
Every judge must consider how her decisions will be characterized in 
the next election cycle or how potential contributors would react to the 
decision. When it comes to this election-related bias, recusal is inade­
quate. Removing one judge who feels pressure to tailor his rulings 
towards a potential reelection bid, and replacing him with another 
judge who feels identical pressure, does little to ensure judicial impar­
tiality. The case must still be heard by a judge—there is simply no 
way to get around that requirement—and every judge will suffer from 
the same job-security biases. This is particularly true with the 
majoritarian difficulty; it applies to all elected judges, not just those 
who received campaign contributions. In short, current recusal rules 
leave judges essentially immune from punishment for acting in a bi­
ased manner,179 and when it comes to election-related judicial bias, 
recusal seems to be an inadequate solution. 
176.	 Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural 
Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 171–72 (2004) (discuss­
ing the efficiency concerns of third-party review of recusal decisions). 
177.	 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2011) (listing specific circumstances when judicial dis­
qualification is required). 
178.	 For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), a judge must recuse if he has “personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” Replacing 
that judge with one who does not have such “personal knowledge” alleviates the 
problem entirely. Id. 
179.	 I am not suggesting a draconian check is necessary. Cf. M.H. Hoeflich, Regula­
tion of Judicial Misconduct from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 79, 82 (1984) (discussing the approaches adopted throughout Eu­
rope in the seventh and eighth centuries, including liability to the aggrieved 
party (and sometimes even the crown) on judges who decided cases as a result of 
favoritism to the other party). 
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III.	 AN ORIGINALIST SOLUTION: THE JURY AS A CHECK ON 
JUDICIAL BIAS 
For many years, scholars have decried judicial elections and sought 
answers to the judicial-bias problem described in Part II. Nonethe­
less, there has been little headway. Now, with every new study show­
ing the extent of judicial bias, the concerns have become dire. 
But this is not the first time in our nation’s history that concerns 
about judicial bias were at the forefront of national conversation. In 
fact, Americans worried about corrupt and biased judges long before 
judicial elections became popular. In the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries, judicial independence and impartiality were 
central to the debates leading up to American independence, as well 
as the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. But for our forefa­
thers, the solution was not recusal.180 Instead, the founding genera­
tion looked to the people themselves to check judicial bias. They 
inserted the people directly into the judiciary to control judicial cor­
ruption and bias from within. The people, serving on juries, would act 
to hold judges accountable, and ensure that judges lived up to the 
principles of the Constitution. For them, the jury was the quintessen­
tial bulwark of liberty—a way for ordinary people to stand up to gov­
ernment officials, including judges, and to ensure judicial 
impartiality. 
A.	 The Founders’ Fear of Judicial Bias 
Although the Founders did not have to worry about judicial elec­
tions,181 they were very concerned about judicial bias and corruption, 
and generally distrusted judicial power. There were a number of 
fears—many of which are analogous to modern-day concerns about 
election-related judicial bias. First, eighteenth-century Americans 
considered judges to be easily corruptible. Since judges—at least trial 
judges—typically work alone, and there are few of them in most juris­
dictions, they might be bribed or otherwise influenced by those who 
appointed them, or by those who appear in front of them. One wealthy 
or powerful litigant who frequently appears in a certain courtroom 
could easily approach a judge with a bribe, a threat, or a promise. 
Second, Americans feared that judges, as government agents, 
might be biased in favor of the government—especially the Executive 
180.	 In fact, recusal was not even required for bias under British common law or at 
the time of the founding in the United States. Recusal was only required when a 
judge had a financial interest in the outcome of the case. Dmitry Bam, Making 
Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011 BYU L. REV. 943, 
952 (discussing the common law recusal standards). 
181.	 Judges were appointed by the governor, the legislature, or both at this time, as 
judicial elections did not become popular until the middle of the nineteenth cen­
tury. See supra notes 28–29. 
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Branch—not because of corruption but because of human nature.182 
This was especially true in criminal cases, as well as civil claims 
against government officials, where judges might go easy on their fel­
low government officers. After all, both the judge and the Executive 
official would be on the government’s payroll and might have the same 
(governmental) interests at heart. Pamphlets of the Revolutionary 
Era frequently included complaints about judicial partisanship in 
favor of other branches of government.183 
Third, judges might also be biased in favor of their friends or the 
community from which they came. After all, American judges are typ­
ically prominent individuals, who may have prominent friends. For 
example, Blackstone acknowledged that while judges are presumed to 
be impartial, judges “will have frequently an involuntary bias towards 
those of their own rank and dignity.”184 Akhil Amar, describing the 
Founders’ concerns, explains that “[u]nchecked by a jury, a judge 
might be tempted . . . to go easy on his wealthy friends.”185 
These fears were not irrational. Rather, they were based on the 
colonists’ experience with the judiciary, both in England and in the 
colonies, in the decades leading up to American independence. For 
example, British judges were perceived as frequent allies of tyrannical 
government officials, aligned with the government against the peo­
ple.186 In the words of one leading Anti-Federalist, “[A] lordly court of 
justice [is] always ready to protect the officers of government against 
the weak and helpless citizen.”187 The colonial experience with judges 
was often similar. One of the biggest complaints during the Stamp 
Act Crisis in 1765 and 1766, for example, was about judicial bias in 
182.	 Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 
1341 (2012) (“Citizens could not trust judges to act independently and decide 
cases without bias toward the British government.”). 
183.	 See ESSAYS OF AN OLD WHIG (1788), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL­
IST 49 (Herbert A. Storing ed., 1981) (“Judges, unencumbered by juries, have 
been ever found much better friends to government than to the people. Such 
judges will always be more desirable than juries to [tyrants].”). 
184.	 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379. 
185.	 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 237 (2005). This fear of judges was 
part of a widespread contempt for lawyers throughout the country during the 
Colonial Era. And judges, as former lawyers, could just as easily “subvert every 
principle of law and establish a perfect aristocracy.” Jeffrey R. Pankratz, Neutral 
Principles and the Right to Neutral Access to the Courts, 67 IND. L.J. 1091, 1103 
(1991) (citing C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY 
LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 191 (1970)). 
186.	 See AKHIL  REED  AMAR, THE  BILL OF  RIGHTS 87 (1998) (describing “the case of 
Prynne and the infamous ‘Bloody Assizes’ of Judge George Jeffreys”), for exam­
ples of a number of high-profile instances in which British judges “abetted gov­
ernment tyranny.” 
187.	 ESSAY OF A  DEMOCRATIC  FEDERALIST (1787), reprinted in THE  COMPLETE  ANTI­
FEDERALIST, supra note 183, at 61. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CIVIL JURY IN A WORLD WITHOUT TRIALS 895 
trials for colonists accused of failing to pay new taxes.188 And as Akhil 
Amar explains, “In ten of the thirteen colonies, the sitting chief justice 
or his equivalent ultimately chose George III over George Washing­
ton” during the Revolution.189 The “intense and widespread anti-
judge sentiment”190 was a common feature of early American law. 
Colonists believed that British judges were biased, and their opinion 
of colonial judges was not all that different. 
These concerns did not dissipate with the adoption of the Constitu­
tion, which offered federal judges life tenure and almost complete judi­
cial independence. When it came to protecting individual rights and 
liberties, judges alone could not—and would not—be trusted. Even 
Article III judges—perhaps the most independent judicial officers in 
the world—were thought to be too biased to serve impartially the role 
of the gatekeeper. After all, these judges were appointed by other fed­
eral elected officials191 and may not have the willpower (or the desire) 
to stand up to those officials in favor of individual litigants.192 No 
matter how independent the judges were, colonists continued to be­
lieve that judges would tend to favor the government, the wealthy, 
and their friends over the interests of the common people.193 
B.	 What: The Jury Solution 
What was the Founders’ solution to the problem of judicial bias? 
Unlike modern-day Americans, they did not trust judges to ensure 
their own impartiality through panoply of recusal rules. In fact, eight­
eenth-century recusal rules did not even apply to biased judges. Back 
then, recusal was required only when a judge had a financial stake in 
the outcome of the case.194 Instead, the solution to judicial bias was 
installing a check on judges within the judiciary itself.195 And that 
188.	 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 23 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994). 
189.	 AMAR, supra note 185, at 207. 
190.	 Roger Roots, The Rise and Fall of the American Jury, 8 SETON HALL CIRC. REV. 1, 
8 (2011). 
191.	 See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
192.	 In fact, this is precisely what happened when Congress passed the Alien and Se­
dition Acts to stifle Republican criticism of the Federalists. The partisan re­
sponse of the Federalist judges exemplified the Founders’ concerns about judicial 
independence and the ability of judges to halt unconstitutional governmental 
action. 
193.	 See BERNARD  BAILYN, THE  IDEOLOGICAL  ORIGINS OF THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 
105 (1967). 
194.	 See Bam, supra note 180, at 952 (discussing the common law recusal standards). 
195.	 Of course, the jury would also serve as a check on legislative and executive au­
thority. See Thomas A. Green, The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-
Finding Traditions on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE  TRIAL  JURY IN 
ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700–1900, at 41, 61 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 
1987) (discussing the role of the jury as a surrogate for what was “viewed as a 
corrupt and unrepresentative parliament”). 
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role was entrusted to the juries. As much as Americans in the late-
eighteenth century distrusted judges, they revered juries. One of the 
main reasons for this reverence was that it gave people the power to 
check corruption within the judicial branch.196 While we typically 
think of the criminal trial jury as an “essential part of the English 
government [and] a necessary counter to governmental authority,”197 
this was no less true of civil juries.198 “For many purposes until the 
nineteenth century the civil and criminal jury were insepara­
ble . . . .”199 Colonial supporters of the jury strongly believed that the 
right of trial by jury in civil cases was an important bulwark against 
tyranny and corruption, and would serve as a check on corrupt and 
biased judges.200 In the early years of this nation “the jury came to be 
viewed as an essential counterbalance to the threat of excessive judi­
cial power.”201 
The right to a trial by jury was central in the American campaign 
for independence. The deprivation of that right was one of the causes 
of the American Revolution.202 A key charge against the King in the 
Declaration of Independence was that he deprived the colonists “of the 
benefits of Trial by Jury.”203 Indeed, the right to a jury trial was the 
only right protected in every state constitution of the founding era.204 
196.	 See BAILYN, supra note 193, at 73–76. 
197.	 Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand 
Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the 
States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2014). 
198.	 Solomon, supra note 182, at 1340 (“Historically, the civil jury in the United 
States, like the criminal jury, was justified in large part as a check against the 
abuse of government power.”). 
199.	 John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French 
Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, 1700–1900, supra 
note 195, at 13, 15. 
200.	 Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Sev­
enth Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 150–53 
(1991). 
201.	 Stephen H. Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in 
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 23 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
202.	 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY 
OF  SEARCH AND  SEIZURE, 1789–1868 (2006) (discussing American outrage over 
Parliament’s creation of juryless courts to adjudicate certain cases). 
203.	 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776). Other Revolutionary 
Era documents, including the 1774 Declaration of Rights of the First Continental 
Congress and the 1775 Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up 
Arms, also listed the denial of the right to a jury trial as a grievance against the 
British government. AMAR, supra note 186, at 83. 
204.	 Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870–71 (1994).  In fact, not only did the 
constitutions of all original colonies guarantee the right to a jury trial, but every 
state that entered the union after the ratification of the Constitution did so with 
a constitution the protected the right in criminal cases. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). 
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The right to a jury trial was also important in the debates sur­
rounding the adoption of the Constitution.205 In fact, when the origi­
nal draft of the Constitution failed to include the right to a jury trial in 
civil cases, the opposition to the omission almost derailed the entire 
project.206 Although the Constitution was ultimately ratified, seven 
states’ ratifying conventions specifically conditioned ratification on a 
future amendment guaranteeing the right to jury trial in civil 
cases.207 Once again, the jury’s power to “check the caprice of biased 
judges” was at the forefront of the colonists’ minds.208  In the words of 
the Federal Farmer, juries “secure to the people at large their just and 
rightful control in the judicial department.”209 According to James 
Madison, the jury would provide a check on governmental power, giv­
ing the people direct control over elements of government.210 Alexan­
der Hamilton also saw the jury as “security against corruption.”211 By 
inserting the people directly into the judiciary, the people would play a 
direct role in the administration of justice and in protecting the people 
from government overreach.212 Historians and legal scholars, from de 
Tocquevile to Akhil Amar, have written volumes emphasizing the 
jury’s role as a check on governmental agents.213 
As is often the case, the writings of Thomas Jefferson reflect the 
sentiment of the time. In a letter to the Abbe´ Arnoux in 1789, Thomas 
Jefferson also focused on the jury as an antidote to the problem of 
judicial bias. Jefferson argued: 
[Judges may be] misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a 
devotion to the Executive or Legislative . . . . It is left therefore to the juries, if 
205.	 AMAR, supra note 185, at 233–35. 
206.	 Id.; see also PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITU­
TION, 1787–1788 (2010) (discussing Anti-Federalist arguments against the Con­
stitution based on its failure to protect jury trials); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE 
STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 26, 265 
(1996) (same). 
207.	 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im­
peachment, shall be by Jury”); id. at amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved . . . .”). 
208.	 Stacey P. Eilbaum, The Dual Face of the American Jury, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 711, 
717 (2013). 
209.	 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 183, at 19. 
210.	 1 ANNALS OF  CONG. 453 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James 
Madison). 
211.	 THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
212.	 Letter from Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 53 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“It is essential in every free coun­
try, that common people should have a part and share of influence in the judicial 
as well as in the legislative department.”); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to the Abbe´ Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 363, 364 
(“[I]t is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government.”). 
213.	 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1966); AMAR, supra note 186, at 73–76, 87. 
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they think the permanent judges are under any biass [sic] whatever in any 
cause, to take upon themselves to judge the law as well as the fact. Were I 
called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legisla­
tive or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the 
Legislative.214 
In discussing the importance of the jury to democratic government, 
Anti-Federalists emphasized that in a dispute between a citizen and a 
federal officer, a judge would likely be biased in favor of the govern­
ment official rather than the “helpless citizen.”215 The jury, the argu­
ment went, would serve as an equalizer—a way around biased judges. 
The fact that judges in most states are now elected, rather than ap­
pointed, only increases the importance of the jury as a check. 
The Supreme Court, too, has recognized that checking against judi­
cial bias was one of the key functions of the jury when it incorporated 
the right to a jury trial against the states. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 
the Court explained that “[t]hose who wrote our constitutions knew 
from history and experience that it was necessary to pro­
tect . . . against judges too responsive to the voice of higher author­
ity.”216 The jury was “an expression of American concerns about 
judicial independence.”217 
C.	 Why: The Advantages of the Jury 
Of course there are a number of reasons for why the Founders re­
vered the jury,218 many of which had nothing to do with judicial bias. 
But specifically with respect to judicial bias, why was the jury their 
chosen mechanism to control biased judges? The Founders were not 
so naı¨ve as to believe that juries were perfect or that jurors cannot be 
subject to biases. Rather, they viewed the jury as part of the checks 
and balances scheme that they created in the Constitution. Just as 
the House and the Senate might check each other, the lay jurors 
might act as a “counterpoise” to a professional judiciary.219 
214.	 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbe´ Arnoux, supra note 212, at 364. 
215.	 A Democratic Federalist, PENN. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE FOUN­
DERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 393. 
216.	 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
217.	 Landsman, supra note 201, at 23. 
218.	 For example, the Founders emphasized the educational function that the jury 
might serve, allowing people to become educated of the laws under which they 
live. In addition, the jury might be able to reach a more just result, even if the 
judge is not biased. There is a long line of literature describing these justifica­
tions for the jury. See, e.g., J. KENDALL  FEW, IN  DEFENSE OF  TRIAL BY  JURY 
(1994); WILLIAM DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS, 
TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002). The jury was 
also the voice of the community. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 213. Finally, be­
cause there were many jurors, the jury might actually serve to act as a more 
accurate decision-maker. 
219.	 See ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 37–65 (1961). 
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First, unlike judges, who could be easily corrupted, jurors would be 
a much more difficult target. In fact, in the eighteenth century, a 
number of colonists argued in favor of the jury motivated precisely by 
this fear of corruption.220 Elbridge Gerry, for example, “urged the ne­
cessity of Juries to guard [against] corrupt Judges.”221 The reasons 
are obvious: because judges were known well in advance of trial, they 
would be much easier to approach and corrupt than a jury. As Black­
stone observed, the jury is “not appointed till the hour of trial.”222 In 
addition, it would take a lot more effort and resources to corrupt a 
large body, like the jury, than a single judge. 
Second, the jury was and continues to be made up of ordinary citi­
zens who are not on the government payroll. The jury thus would not 
be subject to many of the biases that sway judges. That is true even 
for life-tenured federal judges, who “depend upon their role for their 
livelihood.”223 The Founders recognized “the corruptions of power and 
the temptations of office” that judicial appointments would bring.224 
They were concerned largely that those judges would owe a debt of 
gratitude to their former benefactors (i.e., the President and the Con­
gressmen that appointed them). For jurors, who came to their office 
for a single case and would afterwards return to their normal life af­
terwards, there were far fewer temptations. Jurors, unlike judges, 
were not “dependent on the executive for money and position.”225 
They owed their job to no one and would have to answer to no one for 
their decisions.226 Since the agreement of both branches of the judici­
ary (the people and the judges) would be required to reach a final ver­
220.	 Paul K. Sun, Jr., Congressional Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Federal 
Agencies and the Right to Trial by Jury, 1988 DUKE L.J. 539, 557 (1988) (“The 
Framers recognized that at least one function of the seventh amendment was to 
protect individual litigants against corrupt judges . . . .”). 
221.	 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 369 
(2009) (quoting Notes of James Madison (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 585, 587 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). 
222.	 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380; David F. Partlett, The Republican 
Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN  DIEGO L. REV. 1409, 1423 (2004) (“[The 
jury’s] shifting and impermanent composition restricts the ability of powerful fac­
tions and government from suborning the judicial process.”). 
223.	 See Teachout, supra note 221, at 369. 
224.	 WILLIAM  EATON, WHO  KILLED THE  CONSTITUTION?: THE  JUDGES V. THE  LAW  3 
(1988). 
225.	 Thomas, supra note 197, at 1202 (citing THOMAS  ANDREW  GREEN, VERDICT  AC­
CORDING TO  CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE  ENGLISH  CRIMINAL  TRIAL  JURY, 
1200–1800, at 334 (1985)). 
226.	 Of course, this raises its own concerns. One of the major criticisms of civil juries, 
for example, is the fact that they do not have to explain their decisions, and the 
decisions they reach are often irrational or based on passion and prejudice. My 
proposal of a Hybrid Judicial Panel addresses, at least partially, such concerns 
because jurors would have to deliberate alongside judges and would likely feel 
obliged to explain their reasoning to the trial judge. See infra Part IV. 
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dict, biased judges alone would be powerless to impose their biases on 
the people.227 
Not only would jurors have no biases in favor of the government, 
they would not be biased in favor of a specific class or set of friends. 
Whereas a judge might have certain bonds with the powerful or the 
wealthy, the jury, as a group, would remain impartial and indepen­
dent. As William Blackstone explained, “[T]he most powerful individ­
ual in the state will be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of 
another’s right, when he knows that the fact of his oppression must be 
examined and decided by twelve indifferent men.”228 In fact, the 
Founders recognized that judicial bias might even be involuntary. 
Again, in Blackstone’s influential words: 
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and 
our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely en­
trusted to [judges], their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will 
have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and 
dignity.229 
Another important reason why the Founders believed in the jury is 
that they had experienced first-hand the jury’s ability to stand up to 
judges who were perceived to be biased. By the late-eighteenth cen­
tury, the jury had developed a reputation of standing up to power, in­
cluding judicial power. Two incidents had a particularly profound 
influence on Americans of the eighteenth century, shaping their views 
about the role of the jury. First was the jury’s refusal to convict 
Quakers William Penn and William Mead.230 The two men were pros­
ecuted for preaching in public. The jury faced strong judicial pressure, 
and when the jury refused to convict, the judge fined and jailed the 
jurors. One of the jurors, Edward Bushel, sought habeas corpus, and 
the Court of Common Pleas held that jailing or fining the jurors was 
improper. A similar incident took place two decades later, when an­
other London jury acquitted seven bishops of sedition libel, again in 
the face of judicial pressure.231 
The colonial experience was shaped by a similar incident. When 
John Peter Zenger, who had accused the Governor of New York of cor­
227.	 Cf. Letter from Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITU­
TION, supra note 212, at 397, 397 (explaining that if judges were to “subvert the 
law,” then the jury would “check them by deciding against their opinions and 
determinations.” (punctuation omitted)). Again, this is analogous to the Foun­
ders’ design for the federal legislature, where both the lower and the upper 
houses must agree to pass a law. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
228.	 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380. 
229.	 Id. at *379. 
230.	 For a brief summary of William Penn’s trial and the subsequent events, see Scott 
Turow, Best Trial; Order in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1999), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/magazine/best-trial-order-in-the-court.html, 
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/M4JZ-E2ST. 
231.	 See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 14–30 (2003). 
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ruption, was charged with seditious libel in 1735, the judge instructed 
the jury to convict Zenger if it found that he had published the state­
ment in question. There was no question that he had done so. But 
Zenger’s lawyers argued that the jury could find in favor of Zenger 
even if conviction was required by the judge’s instructions. Zenger 
was acquitted, and to the Founders, the case stood for the proposition 
that jurors could defend fundamental rights even when judges were 
unlikely to do so.232 
In fact, the seditious libel cases are a perfect example of the jury at 
work checking judicial bias. Only two people were convicted under the 
law in America during the colonial period, while hundreds of defend­
ants were convicted of the same crime in England.233 The main rea­
son was that even when judges were sympathetic to the law, grand 
juries refused to indict individuals of the crime, and when they did, 
petit juries refused to convict. 
The bias concerns arising out of elections are parallel to those that 
the Founders were worried about. The Founders were worried that 
judges would be biased to government and wealthy friends. The elec­
tion-related concerns are almost identical; judges are biased in favor 
of their donors and in favor of the partisan preferences of the voters. 
The Founders were worried that it would be easier to bribe a perma­
nent judge than temporary jurors. Although bribery might still hap­
pen, it is more likely targeted at a judge than used to influence the 
jury. 
The jury, as the “lower house” of the judiciary, is not subject to the 
same biasing influences as judges. Take money, for example. While 
wealthy individuals contribute money to judges, they cannot do so 
with juries without violating state and federal bribery laws.234 Unlike 
an elected judge, the jury can stand up to the influence of money, the 
fear of losing an election, or concern about breaking campaign 
promises. And although an elected judge might be reasonably nervous 
about how the public will react to his or her decision in a future elec­
tion, jurors have no such worries, because they are the public, and 
they are one-shot players with no need to maintain the job. Jurors 
need not be afraid of how a wealthy corporation will react to their deci­
sions or how their decisions will appear to future voters. 
232.	 Id. at 24. 
233.	 See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 17 (1985). 
234.	 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“As there is always more time 
and better opportunity to tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a 
jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to suppose that a corrupt influence 
would more easily find its way to the former than to the latter.”). 
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D.	 How: Giving Juries the Power to Act as a Check 
The Founders’ reliance on the jury was not merely theoretical or 
rhetorical. The jury in fact had the power and the tools to check 
judges. What made the jury such an effective check on judicial bias? 
There are two major reasons. 
First, there were lots of jury trials.235 American colonists sought 
to “channel as much judicial business as possible” into juried court­
rooms.236 Most civil cases, at least cases involving damages, were 
tried to a jury.237 Settlement was fairly uncommon—arbitration even 
less so—which means that the most important decisions in the case 
were made by jurors. 
Perhaps most importantly, there were few devices allowing judges 
to decide cases on motions without the input or involvement of the 
jury. Before trial, on a procedure called the demurrer to the plead­
ings, a litigant could admit all the facts as stated by the opposing 
side.238 This procedure is somewhat akin to the modern Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, but a demurrer was a risky proposition for a litigant. If the 
defendant lost the motion, then the plaintiff won the case since the 
defendant had admitted all the facts.239 As a result, these motions 
were rarely brought or granted.240 
But if the defendant did not file a demurrer motion and the plain­
tiff did not voluntarily drop the case (a procedure called a nonsuit),241 
the case would go to the jury. The judge could not grant judgment in 
favor of one of the parties because, in the judge’s opinion, the facts 
seemed unlikely or implausible, or because the judge concluded that 
no reasonable jury would rule in favor of a litigant. That was the 
jury’s decision. If, after trial, the judge was convinced that the evi­
dence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, he could order a 
new trial.242 But ultimately, it was the jury who decided which party 
should win, and how much should be awarded in damages. Judges 
235.	 See James Oldham, Law-Making at Nisi Prius in the Early 1800s, 25 J. LEGAL 
HIST. 221, 226 (2004); Thomas, supra note 197, at 1209 (“[M]any jury trials 
occurred.”). 
236.	 AMAR, supra note 186, at 110. 
237.	 Under English common law, the jury heard all cases involving damages while 
equity court judges decided issues involving equitable relief, including specific 
performance and injunctions. Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In 
Suits at Common Law,” 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071, 1084–96 (2010). 
238.	 See Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the En­
glish Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 706–07. 
239.	 See id. 
240.	 See id. at 709, 712. 
241.	 Id. at 722–25. 
242.	 If the second jury agreed with the first, a third trial was rarely ordered. 3 WIL­
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *387. 
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had no fact-finding power, and the jury could play an active role with 
virtually no judicial interference.243 
Not only was the jury able to act as a check on biased judges in 
making its decision, but its mere presence served a watch-dog func­
tion. With the jury constantly monitoring judicial behavior, and per­
haps reporting their observations to fellow citizens, judges would 
think twice before engaging in corrupt or biased behavior. That is one 
big benefit of jury trials: they require judges to act openly and pub­
licly. In fact, some have argued that the court-watching function is 
the core interest of the jury system.244 
Another important reason why the jury was able to act as a check 
on judicial bias was the scope of the jury’s power when those trials 
took place. The jury of our Founders had a significant law-finding 
power. The jury’s power of “jury review”—the ability to acquit a de­
fendant who was charged under what the jury deemed to be an uncon­
stitutional law—was at the core of the jury’s powers. The Supreme 
Court (in Georgia v. Brailsford) held that this law-finding power was 
one of the rights of the jury.245 In fact, some state constitutions ex­
pressly provided for the jury’s law-finding power. The language of 
Georgia’s constitution exemplifies this approach: “The jury shall be 
judges of law, as well as of fact.”246 James Wilson, one of the leading 
drafters of our Federal Constitution, wrote that the jury is “the ulti­
mate interpreter[ ] of the law.”247 Any other approach, according to 
John Adams, would be an “absurdity.”248 
The power that the common law jury wielded was much more than 
the mere ability to engage in jury nullification, a power that exists to 
243.	 Incidentally, the same pattern holds true when it comes to criminal cases. At 
around the time of the founding, there was little plea bargaining. Pleas were 
atypical, and plea bargaining was viewed with suspicion. Alschuler & Deiss, 
supra note 204, at 923–24. Nearly every prisoner demanded a jury trial, without 
countervailing pressure by the court. J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN 
ENGLAND: 1660–1800, at 336–37 (1986) (discussing the prevalence of jury trials in 
criminal cases and a lack of support for plea bargaining). There were no trials by 
judge alone as a trial without the jury was seen as illegitimate. See Thompson v. 
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (holding that a defendant cannot waive the right to a 
trial by jury). 
244.	 Daniel J. Kopp, Note, A Constitutional Right of Access to Pretrial Documents: A 
Missed Opportunity in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 62 IND. L.J. 
735, 748–49 (1987) (discussing the importance of public monitoring of judges). 
245.	 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (“Gentlemen, . . . you have . . . a right to 
take upon yourselves . . . to determine the law as well as the fact in 
controversy.”). 
246.	 GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. IX. 
247.	 AMAR, supra note 186, at 100 (quoting 2 THE  WORKS OF  JAMES  WILSON 221 
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896)). 
248.	 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 254 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850) (explaining 
that the jury should disregard the judge’s instructions on the law if such instruc­
tions were “against [the jury’s] own opinion, judgment, and conscience”). 
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this day. Rather, the jury had a legal right, and a moral right, to 
judge both law and fact. Lawyers frequently argued the law to the 
jury. And many commentators of the time agreed that the jury has 
the duty to find both the law and the facts.249  This power lays largely 
in the jury’s ability to render a general verdict.250 
IV. RESURRECTING THE JURY 
Part III showed that at the time of the founding, the civil jury was 
the primary check on judicial bias in civil litigation. But today, the 
idea that the civil jury can check judicial bias makes little sense. The 
reason is that the civil jury is virtually dead. 
A.	 The Decline of the Jury 
What has happened to the jury? Despite its prominent role in 
American history, the civil jury has been essentially eliminated as a 
major player in our justice system. Recall that the primary reason 
that the jury was able to perform its bias-checking function at com­
mon law was because jury trials were common. Today, jury trials 
make up less than 1% of all state court civil disposition.251 Few law­
yers, even litigators, ever see the inside of the courtroom. In a span of 
two centuries we have gone from trials in almost all civil cases involv­
ing damages, to almost none. The decline began in the nineteenth 
century.252 Throughout the nineteenth century, authority and power 
shifted away from the jury and to judges. Judges, the government 
agents whom the jury was intended to check, and corporate interests, 
the people to whom judges were feared to be indebted, systematically 
removed the most fundamental judicial decisions from the jury’s 
hands and moved them into the hands of the judge.253 
249.	 See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 
582, 583 (1939). 
250.	 See AMAR, supra note 186, at 100–01; William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power 
of Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1005 (2010). 
251.	 See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 768 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance 
of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012). Once again, the 
trend is almost identical in the criminal context. At the time of the founding, the 
criminal jury heard almost every serious criminal case. Now, approximately 95% 
of criminal defendants plead guilty. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the 
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91–100 
(2005). 
252.	 Notes and Comments, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 
74 YALE L.J. 170, 170–71 (1964). 
253.	 It is not just judges who have sapped the jury’s power. The passage of the Fed­
eral Arbitration Act, as well as recent Supreme Court decisions favoring arbitra­
tion, have made it significantly less likely that a jury will ever get to hear a 
dispute between a powerful corporate entity and a harmed individual. See Rent-
A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (holding that an arbitrator, 
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There are a number of reasons for this transformation. On occa­
sion, the jury’s power has been transferred to other tribunals—often 
arbitrators.254 In addition, because the Supreme Court has not incor­
porated the Seventh Amendment against the states, most states do 
not require juries for cases involving smaller amounts of money, do­
mestic relations cases, and a number of other disputes.255 Further­
more, many state and federal rules of procedure now heavily promote 
settlement, requiring the parties to engage in frequent settlement and 
mediation conferences, often supervised by the trial judge who may 
place pressure on the parties to settle.256 
But the most important force that has led to the disappearance of 
the civil jury is the creation and development of procedural tools that 
allow the judge, rather than the jury, to act as the primary decision-
maker (and fact-finder) in many cases. Giving this power to a judge— 
especially a judge who may be biased in favor of one of the parties—is 
problematic, and eliminates the most important check on judicial bias. 
It allows the judge to decide the case behind closed doors, without any 
neutral observer overseeing the judicial decision. There are three key 
dispositive motions that define modern civil litigation. None of the 
three existed at common law, and all three significantly enhanced ju­
dicial power at the expense of the jury. 
The first is the power to dismiss the case upon a defendant’s mo­
tion to dismiss. By granting a motion to dismiss, the judge is able to 
terminate a case if he concludes that the alleged facts do not state a 
claim on which relief may be granted.257 At first glance, this appears 
rather than the court, has the power to decide whether an entire agreement con­
taining an arbitration agreement is unconscionable); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con­
cepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempts state law 
prohibiting waiver of access to a class action in an arbitration agreement). For a 
discussion of this issue, see Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role 
in the Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1258–59 
(2014). 
254.	 Because parties agree to arbitration contracts “voluntarily” and arbitrators are 
not elected, this shift does not raise the same bias concerns that were discussed 
in Part II. 
255.	 See Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v. Chi­
cago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 172–75 (2012); LESTER WALLMAN & LAWRENCE 
J. SCHWARZ, HANDBOOK OF  FAMILY  LAW 291–92 (1989). Only Texas appears to 
allow for jury trials in child custody and other family matters. Kevin Gick, 
“Twelve Mommies and Daddies, Not a Scary Judge Clad in Black”: Why Does 
Only One State Let Juries Decide Child Custody Cases?, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 
617 (2005). 
256.	 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982). 
257.	 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Discussion of Principles of the Law of 
Nonprofit Organizations, 88 A.L.I. PROC. 258, 258 (2011) (“Every state has its 
rules on motions to dismiss . . . .”). Most states modeled their local rules pursuant 
to the federal rules and, therefore, have a correlative rule to Federal Rule 
12(b)(6). See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Barbara Arco, When Rights Collide: 
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to be a purely legal decision. And, before the modern evolution of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, this was not much of a threat for a plaintiff. 
The case would be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief.”258 Just as with the motion for demurrer under 
common law,259 the motion to dismiss was rarely brought because 
most cases were sufficiently pled to survive this stage.260 But in re­
cent years, the Supreme Court has made it easier for trial judges to 
dismiss cases if they determine, using “judicial experience and com­
mon sense,” that the claim is implausible.261 While some states have 
rejected the federal standard, others have followed suit,262 making a 
motion to dismiss an important stage in litigation and leaving the 
trial judge, rather than the jury, as the decision-maker in a large 
number of cases.263 
The second, and probably most important, procedure that has led 
to the decline of the jury is the motion for summary judgment. Once 
again, summary judgment gives the judge an opportunity to dismiss a 
claim before a jury has a chance to get involved. In recent years, sum­
mary judgment has become a docket-clearing mechanism for many 
judges.264 But even worse, summary judgment allows a judge to rely 
on his view of the evidence, without any oversight, to reach whatever 
result the judge desires.265 Many scholars have observed that judges 
are essentially making factual determinations under some legal 
guise.266 Today, summary judgment is the most important tool that 
judges use to take cases away from jury. Not only was there nothing 
Reconciling the First Amendment Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 600 n.88 (1998). 
258.	 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
259.	 See discussion supra Part III. 
260.	 See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dis­
miss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 24 (2010). 
261.	 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007); see generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. 
L. REV. 551, 554–62 (2002) (discussing the history of Rule 8 and the liberal plead­
ing standard of the federal rules). 
262.	 E.g., Iannachino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008) (adopting 
Twombly’s standard). 
263.	 See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008). 
264.	 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliche´s Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003). 
265.	 This is particularly true following the 1986 “summary judgment trilogy” that 
made the summary judgment standard much easier to meet for movants. See 
Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1904 
(1998). 
266.	 Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use 
of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993) 
(discussing how summary judgment allows judges to act as fact-finders). 
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like it at common law, but fact-finding was considered one of the most 
important functions of the jury.267 And in the criminal context, the 
Supreme Court has held that when a judge takes fact-finding author­
ity away from the jury, the defendant is deprived the right to a jury 
trial. But judges in civil cases do this every day. In some cases, in­
cluding many involving civil rights claims, a number of judges over­
whelmingly grant summary judgment in a majority of cases, even in 
those involving numerous disputed factual issues.268 Of the three 
procedures listed, summary judgment appears to be the biggest cul­
prit behind the decline of civil jury trials.269 
The third procedure, one that is substantively similar to summary 
judgment, is judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). With JMOL, just 
as with summary judgment, the judge decides whether a reasonable 
jury could find for the nonmoving party.270 The judge can even grant 
such a motion after a jury finds in favor of nonmoving party. But 
rather than merely having the power to grant a new trial and allowing 
a new jury decide the case, as a judge was able to do under common 
law,271 the judge can now, alone, dismiss the case based on the judge’s 
own opinion of the evidence. 
A non-dispositive procedure that nonetheless enables a biased 
judge to aid a favored litigant in the face of the jury’s verdict is the 
remittitur of damages. Historically, juries have had the power to set 
damages.272 In recent years, some of that power has been taken 
away, protecting corporate defendants from “excessive” punitive dam­
ages. In a long line of cases,273 the Supreme Court held that due pro­
cess limits the amount of damages that a jury can award. By 
characterizing punitive damages as questions of law rather than ques­
267.	 See also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (finding unconstitutional 
Washington’s mandatory sentencing guidelines that permitted judges to increase 
a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum if the judge found that the 
defendant acted with deliberate cruelty). 
268.	 M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judg­
ments, 8 S. CAL. REV. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311 (1999). 
269.	 See David H. Simmons, Stephen J. Jacobs, Daniel J. O’Malley & Richard H. 
Tami, The Celotex Trilogy Revisited: How Misapplication of the Federal Sum­
mary Judgment Standard Is Undermining the Seventh Amendment Right to a 
Jury Trial, 1 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (“[C]ourts are impermissibly 
weighing evidence, construing inferences in favor of the moving party, and mak­
ing credibility determinations that deny litigants the ability to reach trial and 
thereby obstruct litigants from their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.”). 
270.	 FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
271.	 Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 379 (1913). 
272.	 See Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (holding that it is well-settled 
that “where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar 
function of the jury to determine the amount by their verdict”). 
273.	 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996). 
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tions of fact,274 these holdings shift a key power away from the jury 
and into the hands of the professional judiciary. To make matters 
worse, if a judge decides that damages are excessive, the court can 
order that damages be reduced.275 
All of these procedures give the judge the power to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence and act as fact-finders.276 As discussed 
earlier, this was a not a power that judges had under the common law 
and at the time of the founding. With so few cases going to trial, the 
people rarely have an opportunity to perform the heroic functions in­
tended for the jury. And as a result, the key mechanism for holding 
biased judges accountable has faded into oblivion. 
B.	 A Twenty-First-Century Jury: The Hybrid Judicial Panel 
So what is the solution? After all, despite significant scholarly crit­
icism of these modern procedures, they, like judicial elections, are un­
likely to go away. Not only are they engrained in modern civil 
litigation, but it is unclear whether the justice system can ever return 
to trial-centered approach where most cases go to trial. Thus, while a 
proposal to reverse the clock and return to the common law civil proce­
dure is the easiest one to make, it is highly unlikely to be 
implemented. 
But what if, rather than bringing civil litigation back into the 
eighteenth century, we brought the jury into the twenty-first? After 
all, it is not modern civil procedure that needs to be updated, but our 
outdated approach to when the jury gets involved in the case. If mod­
ern civil litigation revolves around pretrial motion practice—including 
motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of 
law—then perhaps the jury can be integrated into pretrial practice. 
Jurors can serve alongside judges on mixed pretrial courts, deciding 
key procedural motions that are now made by judges alone. The ju­
rors would be selected from a jury pool, like we use today, and 
screened by judges to ensure that they are not biased. But rather 
than waiting until trial to empanel a jury, a mini-jury can be em­
paneled early in the case. These Panels, which I call Hybrid Judicial 
Panels, integrate the jury into modern litigation, allowing jurors to 
serve as a check on judicial bias, and give the people a voice at the 
points where we know judicial bias has the potential to be at its peak. 
274.	 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (treating 
punitive damages as questions of law). 
275.	 In this situation, the court must give the plaintiff an option of a new trial. See 
Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299 
(1976). 
276.	 See Thomas, supra note 263, at 251; ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL 
JURY 288–94 (2001). 
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Take the motion for summary judgment. The use of summary 
judgment has increased dramatically over the last few decades.277 As 
explained earlier, when a judge grants summary judgment, the judge 
makes what is ultimately a factual determination: a judge decides how 
a reasonable jury would see the facts, and this perception may be 
colored by the judge’s conscious or subconscious biases.278 As a num­
ber of scholars have pointed out, “[I]t is clear that courts have used 
summary judgment to dismiss many . . . factually intensive cases.”279 
By reserving key decision-making to themselves, judges have excluded 
the jurors from the process. That’s why many Seventh Amendment 
scholars have argued that summary judgment violates the constitu­
tional right to a jury trial.280 
Now consider my proposal. Rather than permitting the judge 
alone to decide whether the facts are sufficient for a reasonable jury to 
find in favor of the nonmoving party,281 the judge and a group of ju­
rors (perhaps as few as two) would consider the motion together. The 
judge could not single-handedly end the case. If the defendant was a 
key contributor to a judge’s election campaign, then a judge could not 
grant summary judgment in the defendant’s favor without convincing 
at least one lay person—a juror—that summary judgment should be 
granted. And in order to convince that juror, the judge would have to 
explain why the law is on the defendant’s side. 
While the idea of judges and jurors working together to decide pre­
trial motions may seem unusual to us, there are a number of jurisdic­
tions throughout the world that have adopted the use of similar mixed 
courts, albeit in different context. The most well-known instances of 
mixed-court use are in France, Germany, and Japan. All three na­
tions allow lay judges (akin to American jurors) to serve alongside pro­
fessional judges in serious criminal cases, and the German system in 
particular has been the subject of numerous articles.282 In fact, as the 
277.	 See Miller, supra note 264, at 984 (noting that summary judgment has been 
transformed from an infrequently granted procedural tool to a powerful pretrial 
device for early resolution). 
278.	 See McGinley, supra note 266. 
279.	 Thomas, supra note 197, at 1226. 
280.	 See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a 
Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988); Arthur R. 
Miller, supra note 264, at 1060 (“The right to a jury trial is at stake on both 
summary judgment and directed verdict motions.”). 
281.	 FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
282.	 See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Compara­
tive Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 462 (1997) (noting 
that France, Italy, and Germany employ mixed courts consisting of lay and pro­
fessional judges); Rene´e Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An 
American on Trial for an American Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 791, 823 (“[I]n France there is no separate sentencing hearing as in a 
typical American court.”); see also John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt 
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jury system has fallen into disrepute throughout the world,283 the use 
of mixed courts has evolved in its place.284 Even in the United States, 
some commentators have suggested “experimentation with combina­
tions of laymen and professional judges.”285 
Admittedly, not much has been written about the use of a mixed 
panel during the pretrial phases, as I am suggesting here. And I have 
been unable to find any nation or jurisdiction that extensively allows 
jurors to work together with judges to decide pretrial motions like the 
motion to dismiss or the motion for summary judgment.286 Nonethe­
less, there is no reason why such a panel would not be feasible in the 
United States. Our courts have access to a large number of potential 
jurors. But because less than 1% of the cases actually get to a jury 
trial, these jury pools are often unused. And because many of the deci­
sions made by judges in deciding motions for summary judgment and 
judgment as a matter of law are factual in nature, there is nothing 
unusual about asking jurors to help the judge make those decisions. 
While there are many benefits associated with mixed courts in 
other nations, I want to focus in particular on how such a Panel once 
again restores the ability of the people to act as a check on judicial 
bias. A Hybrid Judicial Panel immediately offers a check on judicial 
bias because lay judges would outnumber professional, elected judges. 
Just as we saw earlier with the jury, the mere presence of the jury 
may lead a judge to act in a more impartial manner.287 More impor­
tantly, the judge would have to deliberate with the jurors, explaining 
to them why he believes summary judgment should be granted or de­
nied.288 Because the judge’s decision would, in a sense, be public, it is 
the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L REV. 987, 987 (1990) (dis­
cussing mixed courts in Germany). 
283.	 Almost no nation in the world uses juries in civil litigation. Charles S. Desmond, 
Current Problems of State Court Administration, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 565 
(1965) (“[O]urs is the only major country in the world using civil juries . . . .”). 
284.	 John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alterna­
tive Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195. 
285.	 Justin A. Stanley, The Resolution of Minor Disputes and the Seventh Amendment, 
60 MARQ. L. REV. 963, 971 (1977) 
286.	 In Germany, mixed courts appear to be used in a small number of specialized 
court cases. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 865 (1985). 
287.	 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380. 
288.	 Some have argued that independent jury deliberation increases the ability of lay 
judges to check a biased professional judge. Markus Dirk Dubber, The German 
Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 
AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 257 (1995) (“The collaborative model, of course, did not carve 
out an area of independent deliberation for the lay participants and therefore 
limited the lay participants’ ability to check the bias of the professional judges.”). 
This may be true, but the inclusion of jurors in the deliberation is better than the 
status quo, with the judge deciding key dispositive motions without any layper­
son involvement. 
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unlikely that the judge would offer, as a reason, that the defendant is 
an in-state litigant likely to support his reelection bid. And just like 
jurors of the past few centuries, the panelists would not be beholden to 
any special interest group or an especially valuable campaign contrib­
utor. Of course, merely including lay judges in the deliberation does 
not alone guarantee an impartial adjudication; the risk of bias is re­
duced if only because the different biases and interests are balanced 
against each other.289 
The Hybrid Judicial Panel does more than just reduce the likeli­
hood that the professional judge will exercise his bias during the most 
important phase of the adjudicatory process. In fact, “[T]he mixed 
jury system would afford the professional judges and laypersons with 
the opportunity to share their knowledge and experience through ef­
fective communications.”290 Jury participation in pretrial motions 
will lead to more robust deliberation, and may lead to better results, a 
higher quality of justice, and a better understanding of the facts.291 
Because a decision by a Hybrid Judicial Panel would be a decision of 
3–5 people, rather than a single judge, it is less likely to be the result 
of bias and more likely to be anti-dictatorial.292 The increased num­
ber of participants, and increased diversity, would likely make Panel 
decisions more accurate than those made by a single jurist.293 
C.	 The Best of Both Worlds: Check on the Jury 
And that’s not all! Not only does the Panel provide protection 
against judicial bias, but it also addresses the three major criticisms of 
the jury system. The jury’s decline is partly due to three major criti­
ques of the jury: that the jury is incompetent, biased, and inefficient. 
There is a rich body of literature both attacking the jury and defend­
ing it from these critiques.294 I would like to conclude by explaining 
how the Hybrid Judicial Panel can address these critiques as well. 
One of the most prominent complaints about the civil jury is that 
the jurors are incapable of understanding the complex issues that are 
289.	 ABRAMSON, supra note 188, at 99–141. 
290.	 Antoinette Plogstedt, Citizen Judges in Japan: A Report Card for the Initial 
Three Years, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 393 (2013) (“This hybrid system 
would inject public sentiment and common sense, eliminate judicial bias, and im­
prove civic education.”). 
291.	 See Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Pre­
serving Continental Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 155–56 (2009) (discussing how 
the Japanese jury system has secured these advantages). 
292.	 See 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 247, at 222. 
293.	 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN 
THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, 
AND NATIONS (2004). 
294.	 See, e.g., VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 201; STEPHEN 
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995). 
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central to modern civil and criminal litigation. Civil cases often re­
quire the understanding of sophisticated technology, complex machin­
ery, or complicated products. But jurors, the argument goes, have no 
training or knowledge in any of these fields.295 To make matters 
worse, the selection process has been criticized for producing a jury of 
limited intellectual ability and sophistication.296 As a result jurors 
are potentially swayed by appeals made to prejudice or emotion and 
may be unable to evaluate the evidence placed before them.297 And as 
laws, and jury instructions, have become more complex, these criti­
cisms of the jury have grown. 
To make matters worse, we rarely know why a jury did what it did. 
Juries do not give reasons for their decisions, and their deliberations 
are usually secret. We don’t know whether the jury simply ignored 
the law and the facts. These concerns lead to another one: lack of pre­
dictability. Different juries reach different conclusions in seemingly 
identical cases. In recent years, juries have received negative public­
ity because of some surprising verdicts.298 While some of these com­
plaints may be overblown—studies seem to show that juries decide 
cases similar to judges,299 and judges generally praise jury perform-
ance—there is certainly some truth to all of them. 
The Hybrid Judicial Panel addresses many of these critiques. If 
the trained professional judge is indeed more competent to resolve the 
complex factual dispute between two litigants, the judge can share his 
knowledge with the jury, educating the jurors in the process. Rather 
than leaving jurors alone to understand the vagaries of patents or 
medical technology, the judge can guide the discussion of these issues 
to the extent they are relevant to deciding a summary judgment mo­
295.	 But cf. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1174 (2001) (discussing the jury’s ability to understand 
complex trial evidence). 
296.	 Albert W. Alschuler, Explaining the Public Wariness of Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 
407, 408 (1998) (“The public who serve as jurors are less educated than the 
norm . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
297.	 See id. 
298.	 Perhaps the most famous case involved a large verdict awarded to a woman 
burned by her McDonald’s coffee. See Stuart Pfeifer, L.A. Woman Sues McDon­
ald’s Over Hot Coffee, 20 Years After Huge Verdict, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/09/business/la-fi-mo-la-woman-sues­
mcdonalds-over-hot-coffee-20-years-after-huge-verdict-20140109, archived at 
http://perma.unl.edu/SVJ9-7P76 (“[A] jury awarded $2.9 million to a woman who 
was badly burned after she spilled hot coffee into her lap at a McDonald’s in 
Albuquerque. That verdict was widely criticized and became a rallying cry for 
advocates of legal reform.”). 
299.	 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63–64 (1966) (concluding 
that judges and juries reach similar decisions around 80% of the time); Larry 
Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning 
and Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 46–49 (1994) (presenting similar 
conclusions). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CIVIL JURY IN A WORLD WITHOUT TRIALS 913 
tion or a motion to dismiss. This allows jurors to learn about judges 
and the law, and that has historically been seen as an important func­
tion of the jury system.300 In fact, the “jury was in part an intermedi­
ate association designed to educate and socialize its members into 
virtuous thinking and conduct.”301 
Even though jurors would outnumber judges on the Panel, it is un­
likely that jurors would simply ignore the judge’s views. Quite to the 
contrary. Judges will be popularly elected political figures, and they 
would exercise some influence over their co-panelists. In fact, this was 
true even under the common law jury system. Judges were frequently 
highly respected local figures who could hold sway over their neigh­
bors and acquaintances serving as jurors.302 Even during the time 
when the jury had the power to determine both law and fact, Thomas 
Jefferson recognized that jurors often deferred to the judge on ques­
tions of law, using its law-finding functions in cases involving “biased 
judges.”303 Studies have shown that a jury foreperson holds signifi­
cant sway over jury deliberations,304 and it is likely that a trained 
judge would hold similar sway over a group of lay jurors.305 
The secrecy concerns are also diminished. Today, juries do not give 
reasons for their decisions, and some have suggested that for this rea­
son, the jury’s “claim to be [a] deliberative-democracy institution[ ] is 
on shaky ground.306 But the Hybrid Panel would give a reason for its 
decision. It would have to write an opinion explaining why a motion 
for summary judgment, or a motion to dismiss, was denied. Thus, 
while judge-jury deliberations would still remain secret (just as single-
judge “deliberations” remain secret), the final product of those deliber­
ations would be revealed. In addition, public (and litigant) confidence 
about jury decision-making is likely to increase by simply knowing 
that a professional judge has taken part in the deliberation. 
Some might complain that while I spent a great deal of time dis­
cussing judicial bias, I have ignored the fact that jurors are often bi­
ased as well. They might be biased against deep pocket defendants 
300.	 Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. 
REV. 127. 
301.	 AMAR, supra note 186, at 93. 
302.	 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LE­
GAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 33 (1975). 
303.	 Daniel D. Blinka, Jefferson and Juries: The Problem of Law, Reason, and Politics 
in the New Republic, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 38 (2005). 
304.	 Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose 
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 729–30 (1992) (discussing the im­
portant role that the jury foreman can play in jury decision-making). 
305.	 Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L. 
REV. 243, 295 n.270 (2000) (explaining that juries accord judges “enormous defer­
ence and respect”). 
306.	 Solomon, supra note 182, at 1365. 
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such as insurance companies, hospitals, and large corporations.307 
They might harbor racial or gender biases.308 There is no question 
that one of the reasons the jury lost much of its power is due to its own 
biases. 
But just as the presence of the jury can help counter judicial bias, 
the presence of a judge will help counter jury bias for many of the 
same reasons. Jurors will be forced to deliberate with a professional 
judge about the law and could not simply rely on prejudices or biases 
in justifying their decision. Arguments based on race and gender bias 
are less likely to be made in the presence of a respected judge. But 
even if the Hybrid Panel reached the “wrong” verdict, its mistakes 
would arguably be less harmful. Every new case would involve a new 
set of jurors. Unlike a judge, who might be biased in favor of a 
wealthy contributor in every case involving that contributor, a new 
group of jurors would hear the next case involving that contributor. 
The Panel’s mistakes would not threaten the right to impartiality (or 
democratic virtues) like the biases of a single judge could. 
Finally, one important reason for the increased use of pretrial pro­
cedures like summary judgment is that litigation is costly and time 
consuming, and summary judgment allows for the resolution of issues 
without trial and the expenses associated with it.309 With long 
backlogs in most state courts, jury trials require a great deal of time 
and resources. But while the Hybrid Judicial Panel adds additional 
expense and time, the Panel is substantially more efficient than a full-
blown jury trial. Since the judge must already decide the motions 
alone, adding a group of jurors to that consideration is unlikely to sig­
nificantly delay the resolution of the motions. Also, the jury is signifi­
cantly smaller than the typical twelve-person jury we see in the few 
civil cases that actually reach trial.310 In addition, the benefits of 
countering judicial bias far outweigh the minor additional delay and 
expense that might result from the inclusion of lay judges in the pre­
trial litigation process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Civil litigation has evolved a great deal since the time of the found­
ing. Whereas litigation then revolved around the trial, modern civil 
307.	 Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An 
Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121 (1996). 
308.	 J.R. POLE, CONTRACT & CONSENT: REPRESENTATION AND THE  JURY IN  ANGLO­
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 133 (2010) (discussing history of jury racial bias in civil 
rights litigation in the South); see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 
526–27 (1973) (recognizing that racial bias infects jury deliberations). 
309.	 See Miller, supra note 264, at 986 (discussing the “recent outcry” in curbing the 
social costs of litigation). 
310.	 See JONAKAIT, supra note 231, at 90 (discussing the benefits of smaller juries). 
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litigation is largely about pretrial. Discovery and motion practice are 
at the core of the twenty-first-century civil lawyer’s experience. But 
our conception of the jury has remained static. The jury appears on 
stage only at trial, and these days, the play is long over. It is time for 
the civil jury to evolve. The jury should play an active role at the most 
important stages of modern civil litigation. My proposal—the Hybrid 
Judicial Panel—allows for just that. It reintroduces the jury into 
American civil jurisprudence, and allows the jury to serve the bias-
checking role it was intended to serve. 
